

## *What Name for Europe?*

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# The Students of the College Respond to Giscard d'Estaing's Invitation

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**Alessandro Fusacchia<sup>1</sup>**

On the occasion of the opening ceremony of the academic year of the College of Europe, last October 2nd in Bruges, President Giscard d'Estaing put forward the idea of reflecting upon the name for the future Europe, as it will be reshaped by the work of the Convention and renewed by Eastern enlargement. These two processes do and will have such important consequences that they are likely to be a definite turning point in the history of European integration and to influence profoundly the form, functioning, and scope of the Union.

Giscard d'Estaing's proposal should be read in this respect as an invitation to reconsider our own idea of Europe through the very symbolic exercise of choosing the name of the common political and societal project which is associated with it. In his own words:

'What will be the name of this renewed Europe? It seems to me that we have the choice among four possible names: 'European Community', 'European Union', 'United Europe', 'United States of Europe'. This issue is not futile, for the name has a symbolic strength and allows every citizen to identify the nature and ambition of the European project.'

He then declared that it would be interesting to know the feeling of Europeans, especially the young, on this issue, before asking the Convention to debate upon it. He finally asked of the students of the College to discuss upon the name of the future Europe and expressed his curiosity in knowing what the result of an opinion poll among them would be.

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1 Alessandro Fusacchia is Student in European Political and Administrative Studies, College of Europe, Bruges, Promotion Bertha von Suttner. He has coordinated the activity of the Working Group on the the Name of the Future Europe.

The students of the College are in many respects representative of the cultural variety of the Union. All European nationalities are represented, in a proportion that is close to that of the different peoples of Europe, and without any dominant majority. The College is a European microcosm, a unique venue where students *agree* on, and share, as part of a single community which leaves room for discussion, confrontation and *disagreement* within it.

We have decided to follow up President Giscard d'Estaing's invitation, and we have involved a number of outstanding academics and politicians in our reflection upon the name of the future Europe. This special issue of *Collegium*, the academic journal of the College of Europe, therefore presents the results of the opinion poll conducted among the students on the issue of the name, complemented by the wider and deeper opinions collected among our guest-writers. It is intended as part of the College contribution to the work of the Convention. It comes at the end of the College academic year, which coincides with the final sessions of the Convention, while this latter is dealing with the most contentious issues concerning our European political community. In this respect, discussing the name is a far less controversial issue, which surely unites European citizens in a joint exercise, despite their differing preferences and views. It is nevertheless a stimulating undertaking and contingent on the efforts to 'design' the future constitutional shape of the EU. In this sense, institutional choices and reflections on the appropriate name for the Union that will emerge as a result of these choices are complementary.

Some months have passed since Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's speech in Bruges, last October. The stone cast into the lake has not remained without consequences. Few days after Bruges, in an interview given to the *Financial Times*, Giscard d'Estaing admittedly declared to like 'United Europe' the most.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, an opinion poll was launched by the *European Voice*, which invited its readers 'to choose the name for the EU of tomorrow' and to express their preference through the *ad hoc* webpage expressly created for that purpose. Quite interesting to point out, the *European Voice* retained the idea of a debate on the name for the future Europe, and acknowledged Giscard d'Estaing as the first source of the initiative, without, however, proposing among the different options the four names mentioned by the former French President, but suggesting instead six names, out of which only three of Giscard d'Estaing's four names were recalled. For the sake of curiosity, these possible six names were, in addition to 'United States of Europe', 'United Europe' and the current 'European

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2 'Rebranding Europe could create "United Europe"', in: *BBC News*, 7 October 2002. To be found at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2307303.stm>



Union', 'United Nations of Europe', 'European Federation' and 'Europe' *tout court*. Surprisingly, 'European Community' was not among the choices. The first days of the poll saw a *tête à tête* between 'European Union' and 'United Nations of Europe', but later on 'United Europe' got so many preferences that it caught up with the other two options and won at the end of the poll.<sup>3</sup> Giscard d'Estaing is probably happy to note that his own preference corresponded to the preference of readership of the *European Voice*.

In the meanwhile, the skeleton of the would-be European Constitution was elaborated by the Convention Praesidium and presented to the press and European citizens. In Article 1, under the title concerning the 'definition and objectives of the Union', the question of the name of the future Europe was addressed. It simply reported that a decision would have been taken to 'establish [an entity called the European Community, European Union, United States of Europe, United Europe]'. It can be expected that a definite stance will be taken by the Convention in the course of its final plenary session.

Recently, the Greek Presidency of the EU has invited European citizens to express online their preferences and opinions on a number of issues related to the present and future Europe. One of the questions posed concerns the name of the future Europe. In a somehow vague reference to President Giscard d'Estaing's first idea, it is asked: 'Some people have suggested that the enlarged EU should have a new name. What would you like?' A fifth name, 'Europa', in addition to the current denomination, 'European Community', 'United Europe', and 'United States of Europe' figures among the possible choices. By the end of May 2003, more than 40.000 had voted, and 'European Union' was leading the race with more than 66% of the share of votes.<sup>4</sup>

So far, the issue of the name of Europe has attracted the attention of many observers, including some outside the seats of the Convention and in a wider context than those who are directly concerned by the institutional reforms and the 'Brussels circle'. Although its relevance is mostly symbolic, the issue of the name has the potential to reach all European citizens indiscriminately. It is an issue which reaches academics, businessmen, bakers, members of parliaments,

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3 Cf. 'Choose a Name for the All-new Europe', in: *European Voice*, 10-16 October 2002, p. 32, and 'EV pollsters give their seal of approval to "United Europe"', in: *European Voice*, 21-27 November 2002, p. 2.

4 The other names had obtained: 'European Community' (6.1%), 'United Europe' (8.2%), 'United States of Europe' (6.5%), 'Europa' (9.2%), Other (3.2%). The poll of the Greek Presidency is available at <http://evote.eu2003.gr/EVOTE/Intro.aspx?lang=1&poll=1&si=3&v=156816> (May 26, 2003).

bus drivers, heads of states, public administrators, housewives and so on, in a similar way. No special knowledge is required to form and express an opinion, and everybody feels and perceives he or she is reflecting upon something that touches all Europeans. This is also a reason which militates in favour of deciding upon the name via the means of a referendum.

The suggestion of holding Europe-wide referenda is not new. The idea that all citizens of the Union would vote on the same day on a single question of common concern is appealing, and encouraging for all those who consider that a common European identity, as a further layer in addition to national, regional and communal identity, already exists. The proposal has practical limitations. However, little – if any – negative implication would result from a Europe-wide referendum on the name to be associated with the future integration process. It would be harmless and its results could be used as a source for better assessing the potential of such an instrument for the further democratisation of the European Union. Moreover, similarly to the first article of the Convention, the first European referendum would be devoted to the basic question of what to name ourselves, of how to synthesise in a word (or few) our shared feeling of belonging to a wider community.

National and European institutions have kept silent on the name of future Europe. They are represented in the Convention and have preferred to leave the point as a subject for debate and consensual decision. Clearly, the name of the European project cannot be subject to trade-off or package deals. The Commission represents the only exception in speaking out on the matter. Two reasons probably explain the Commission's decision. First, its choice is included within its second communication on institutional architecture, which dates back to last December.<sup>5</sup> Together with the first communication presented in May 2002<sup>6</sup>, this second contribution is intended to reflect the Commission's views on all major aspects involved in the present exercise of constitutional engineering. Second, the Commission's choice is in fact a confirmation of the current name associated with the European project, and it therefore represents more continuity than an original position. In this respect, the Commission's choice is more in favour of an institutional approach to integration, and the associated symbolic issue in the case at hand, than of a specific denomination:

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5 Commission of the European Communities, *For the European Union. Peace, Freedom, Solidarity. Communication of the Commission on the Institutional Architecture*, COM (2002) 728 final, Brussels, 4 December 2002, p. 5.

6 Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission. A Project for the European Union*, COM (2002) 247 final, Brussels, 22 May 2002.

'[...] the European project should be clearly identifiable in a name. The Commission considers that the term "European Union", with which the citizens of Member States and candidate countries have grown familiar, encapsulates well the objectives of the European project.'

There is probably a much more profound reason why the Commission would prefer to keep the current name. In recent years, the Commission has tried to increase transparency, better the visibility of the institutions and improve access to information, in an attempt to bring the Union closer to its citizens. This attempt has found in 'European Union' its logo. Similarly to what has occurred with the introduction of the euro, the motor of integration has bet on one name to make further integration a success. Peter van Ham argues that brands are no longer limited to companies' products, but also affect political entities such as towns, regions and even States.<sup>7</sup> In most cases they are helpful in identifying and fixing what is evolving, and nevertheless need to be comprehended. This is nothing new. Jacques Le Goff wrote that 'Europe has had a name for 25 centuries, but it is still at the project stage'.<sup>8</sup> 'European Union' is the brand associated with the most recent phase of this project, which did not begin at Maastricht, but in Rome, in the second half of the '50s. A brand with which the outside world associates the path we are walking together as European citizens.

This special issue is composed of three parts. The first one comprises two articles. Peter Gommers reflects on the history of the name 'Europe', associated with the myth of the young lady abducted by Jupiter-bull, from its contested origin until the first decades of the XX century. Gommers' article can be considered as an introduction to an enchanting cultural underworld made up of historical galleries where all arts – poetry, painting, and music, to name but a few - convene to pay tribute to the mythical-visual representations of the Continent. The myth of Europa reminds us of the double nature of our civilisation: the strength, embodied by Jupiter-bull, and the gentleness, in the figure of the young lady.

In the second article, Thomas Risse gives a first assessment of the emerging European public sphere. The name of Europe is the symbol itself, spread by word of mouth, from country to country. The uniting of Europe is not a question of boundary expansion until the eastern frontier, for a definition of the latter remains unclear. It is a matter of integrating fifteen, twenty-five or thirty

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7 Peter van Ham, 'The Rise of the Brand State', in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 5, 2001, pp. 2-6.

8 Quoted in Giuliano Amato, 'A Strong Heart for Europe', in: Christian Joerges, Yves Mény and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds.), *What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer*, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/00 (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 2000), p. 119.

countries into one common political area. It is a matter of creating public debates on Europe within national borders, and on national issues across borders. European citizens have more in common than they expect, and enjoy a plurality of uniqueness beyond any imagination. A European public sphere, a common square, is what citizens need to confront among their similarities and differences, to understand what to share and what to keep separated. Risse's article explores the interrelationship between the existence of a democratic polity and of a public sphere at EU level in a way that provides an insight into salient questions on the future shape of the EU, its 'democratic deficit' and its 'deficit in public sphericity'. Europe will one day have a public sphere. If not, it simply fails its mission. There are signs that a European public sphere is emerging and in his article, Risse offers an insight into this public sphere and how to measure it, and represents an attempt to 'make sense of it'. No truly common European identity can be fostered without the development of this public space, and in the name of Europe this common identity will be summed up.

The second part of the issue comprises four contributions. Giscard d'Estaing proposed four names for the future Europe, and we have asked eminent politicians and academics to each contribute a short piece on one of these four names. We have not asked for a strict defence of a name. The different contributions must be read more as *reflections* than apologies. Certainly, the personality, style, and personal preference of the authors have produced quite varied pieces. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Jean Monnet Chair at the New York University, who in a 1998 article had already mentioned his dissatisfaction with the choice of 'European Union'<sup>9</sup>, analyses the name 'European Community'. Emilio Colombo, Senate life member of the Italian Republic, makes the case for maintaining the current name, whose first fortune coincides with the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration, itself a result of the Genscher-Colombo Act of the beginning of the Eighties. As far as 'United Europe' is concerned, we have called upon outstanding politicians and intellectuals from eastern countries to share their opinions. In Giscard d'Estaing's view, the adoption of 'United Europe' would be a tribute to the candidate countries, which can finally rejoin 'Europe' after decades of Soviet patronage. Fifteen years after the fall of the iron curtain, West and Eastern Europe unite together. For this reason, we deemed it best to leave the floor directly to the Eastern countries, and listen to their consideration of this proposal. In this respect, we considered Bronislaw Geremek, Polish historian and politician, as well as Vaclav Havel, former President of the Czech Republic, to be

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9 Joseph H.H. Weiler, 'Europe: The Case Against the Case for Statehood', in: *European Law Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, p. 60.

the most prominent and representative potential contributors. Both their contributions are in the form of interviews. Last but not least, Gilbert Trausch, Director of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches R. Schuman at the University of Liège, portrays the history of the name 'United States of Europe', starting with the words pronounced by Victor Hugo before the *Assemblée nationale* one hundred and fifty years ago.

The third and final part of the issue presents the results of the poll conducted among the students of the College of Europe, in both campuses of Bruges and Natolin. As can be anticipated, most students voted for keeping 'European Union', yet it can be argued that *different* reasons lay behind the same choice. Instead of 'imaginer un nouveau nom pour l'Union', the students prefer to keep the current denomination.<sup>10</sup> For the sake of interest, in Bruges the other three names received an almost exactly equal share in percentage, meaning that, following 'European Union', 'European Community', 'United Europe' and 'United States of Europe' count on comparable support. The presentation of the poll results is accompanied by some interesting data. For instance, all non-European students who took part in the vote preferred 'European Union', proving the outside world to be already familiar with the name associated with the European polity. In addition to the statistical evidence, we present some of the comments made by students at the moment of their vote. Some reflect preferences for other names than the four suggested by the Convention President. Again, they mirror the enriching beauty of European diversity.

There is no common reason for retaining 'European Union' instead of another denomination. However, the view expressed by Renzo Imbeni, Vice-President of the European Parliament, fairly succinctly identifies one powerful line of thought:

'I know it could be tempting to say: "We too can do the United States of Europe the same way as the United States of America was done". Ours, however, is not only a union of States. 'United States of Europe' would be weak compared to a union which is made up of States, peoples, nations, citizens. 'European Union' goes further, is much richer, and better renders the idea of a union of different entities. It is more than the sum of nationalisms. Europe is not America. The United States was born when the obstacles consisted only in the red Indians, bisons and the Rocky Mountains. Moreover, Americans had a civil war that ultimately was a trifle, compared to the European civil

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10 Cf. Alain Faujas, 'A Bruges, Robert Picht plonge les étudiants dans le bouillon de culture des Quinze', in : *Le Monde Economie*, 21 October 2002: 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing [...] vient de demander aux étudiants de la promotion 2002-2003 "Bertha von Suttner" d'imaginer un nouveau nom pour l'Union européenne. Pas moins.'

wars. It lasted five years with little more than one million people dead. Europeans have a history of tremendous wars, the Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years War, wars between North and South, East and West. Therefore, this union of different peoples, States, nations, cultures, languages that gather together, and do it for they share common values and not because they are identical, is better expressed by the concept of 'European Union'. 'European Community marks a period which belongs to the past. 'Community' is very beautiful, however it gives the idea of *one* identity, whereas we have *many* identities. 'United Europe' is weaker. In the word 'Union' there is more voluntarism, there is more a democratic aspect. We are in for we want to stay in. 'United' gives more the idea of an imposition.'<sup>10</sup>

At the College of Europe, about forty nationalities are represented, in the absence of any dominant majority. As young Europeans, we learn to live together in this European Union that, as Romano Prodi declared during his speech at the Opening session on the Convention on the future of Europe, is a 'union of minorities'.<sup>11</sup>

Many people have contributed to make the idea of this special issue a reality. On behalf of the students of the College, the members of the *ad hoc* Working Group on the Name of the Future Europe would like to express their gratitude to Marc Vuijlsteke, Chief Editor of *Collegium*, for believing in the value of the project, Christine Reh and Christopher Reynolds, Co-editors, for their practical support and constant overview, and Lasia Bloss, Anke Freude, Dominik Hanf, Katarína Janovova, Fiona Kennedy, Cezary Lewanowicz, Fabrizio W. Lucioli, Robert Picht, Jacques Rupnik, Mariusz Sielski, Iris Urban and Orietta Zanella, for their important support in various ways. The members of the working group are grateful to the authors for their participation in this initiative. Moreover, they thank Olivier Costa, Elemer Hankiss, Bob Hine, Wolfram Kaiser, Michael A. Köhler, Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, Hans Nilsson, Francis Snyder, Gilbert Trausch, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Peter van Ham, Professors at the College, as well as Christopher Reynolds and Pierpaolo Settembri, Teaching Assistants, for having submitted their thoughts on the four names, which have been used by the students as the basis for a reflected choice expressed in the poll.

*Dulcis in fundo*, very special gratitude is due to Miguel Angel Medina Abellán, Teaching Assistant at the College of Europe, for without his assistance this issue would never have come to light.

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10 Interview with Renzo Imbeni, Brussels, 19 March 2003.

11 Romano Prodi, Brussels, 28 February 2002. To be found at <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/181.pdf>

# Europe: The Name of a Civilisation

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**Peter H. Gommers<sup>1</sup>**

## *1. Introduction*

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It is difficult to imagine that one Name can represent an ever-changing civilisation which stands for a multitude of values, that vary over a time span of more than three thousand years. A 'Name', that is the expression of a changing geographical entity; that can be applied to widely different political situations, that plays a role in all cultural expressions and tendencies of that civilisation. A 'Name' recognised by its population in its historic, cultural, geographical, economical and political context through the ages. And to this day continues to play an important role in the expression of a number of ideas, of values, of interests, of institutions, of ideals. It all started at the beginning of our civilisation in ancient Greece and its variegated mythology. A mythology, that within a religious context, encompassed philosophy and natural sciences, became part of literature and other cultural expressions, and got involved in the political controversies of that time. That 'Name' from the Greek mythology is 'Europe'.<sup>2</sup> Apparently, it all began with the Greek myth of the beautiful Phoenician princess, who was carried away by Zeus in the form of a bull to Crete.

## *2. The Religious Mythical Background*

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Greek mythology represents a dynamic process that developed over more than a thousand years. The myth of the Phoenician princess Europa came to full

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1 Peter H. Gommers is author of *Europe. What's in a Name*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001.

2 *Europe* spelled with an 'e' represents here the name of the geo-political entity. *Europa* with an 'a' stands for mortals or immortals mentioned in Greek mythology.

bloom in the beautiful poem *Europa* of Moschos (2nd century AD). In that beautifying process of the myth, Europa begot different fathers and mothers, while the number of brothers continued to grow. The oldest written story of the Europa myth was found on a fragment of Hesiod (7th century BC). It reads:

‘Zeus saw Europa, the daughter of Phoenix, gathering flowers in a meadow with some nymphs and fell in love with her. So he came down and changed himself into a bull and breathed from his mouth a crocus. In this way he deceived Europa, carried her off and crossed the sea to Crete where he had intercourse with her. Then in this condition he made her live with Asterios, the king of the Cretans. There she conceived and bore him three sons, Minos, Sarpedon and Rhadamanthys [...]’

The manifold metamorphoses of Zeus in Greek mythology during his amorous escapades were intended to deceive his jealous spouse goddess Hera or Juno for the Romans. The real origin of Zeus’ bull shape must be found in the ancient worship of Zeus in the form of a bull.

At this time there was probably not yet a connection between the myth and the geographical name of the continent. Hesiod mentions in his *Theogony* another Europa among the Oceanides, a river-nymph probably related to the river Europus circling around mount Olympus. When late in the 6th century BC Hecataeus referred to the northern part of the habitable world, Europe, he made no reference to the myth. The oldest written reflection concerning the Europa-myth is in Homer’s *Ilias* (Iliad):

‘Nor when I loved the daughter of far-renowned Phoenix  
Who bore to me Minos, and Rhadamanthys the godlike.’

The names of the sons indicate that Homer is referring to Europa, and that he, as oldest source, names Phoenix as her father. Phoenix appears as a proper name in ancient Greek literature and history, but this name could also be related to the region of the city-states Sidon and Tyre, which the Greek called Phoenicia. The poetic language of Bacchylides, 5th century BC, describes in one hymn Europa as ‘noble daughter of Phoenix’ and the ‘white-armed Phoenician maiden’. Since she is white-armed, the expression ‘Phoenician maiden’ should be interpreted as meaning ‘the daughter of Phoenix’ and not ‘coming from Asian Phoenicia’. But of course one could come to the interpretation of her Asian origin. Euripides in the same century, mentions for the first time her descent from Tyre, a city-state in the coastal region only the Greek called Phoenicia. In that age the Greeks became conscious of the enormous influence of the Asian and Egyptian empires



on their cultural development and looked for it, amongst others, in a foreign origin of their gods and mythology. In Moschos' poem Europa wakes up with a start from a dream in which two women, representing Asia and an unknown country, were fighting over her.

The kernel of the myth is the absorption of ancient Cretan heroes into Greek mythology. The Europa myth must have been shaped in Crete by Greek conquerors. Given the time span, it can be safely assumed the myth's origin has to be found among the Dorian conquerors of Crete. There are various examples of how Zeus was being used to include older pre-Greek goddesses into Greek mythology. For that purpose Zeus was married to them or entered into more temporary arrangements whereby some of the older goddesses were given a human status. As it happens there are on Crete as well as on Greece examples of pre-Greek goddesses with the name Europa. On Crete the Hellenia-Europa festivities are known and in Greece Demeter-Europa is mentioned.

The conclusion is drawn that a Pelasgian pre-Greek goddess from the continent was brought to Crete by Pelasgians or Achaeans, before the arrival of the Dorians in Crete. The oldest writers mention Europa coming from overseas, but not from where. For them it is obvious that overseas was Greece. In Greece Europa and Demeter were also worshipped in the form of a bull. All the elements of the initial version of the Europa-myth were to be found in Greece and Crete, they only had to be put into a logical sequence for the audience of later centuries. However, originally Europa was a pre-Greek/Pelasgian goddess from Thessalia and probably the virgin, spring incarnation of a goddess worshipped as a trinity, or triad. Thus the mythical Europa is European after all...

### 3. The Name as a Geo-political Entity

The oldest geographic concept of the name Europe goes back to the early part of the second millennium BC. The Greek historian Hellanicus, 5th century BC names the Thracian coastal area opposite and to the right of the island Thàsos, Europe. The Roman historian Pompeius Trogus of the beginning of the Christian era also indicated a continental Europe, east of the Thracian mountains. It was ruled by a king Europs, a generation before the war of Troy. Remarkably, there is also mention of a town in Thracia, Europus, and two towns in Thessalia, which has, as mentioned, a river by the same name circling around mount Olympus. The name of the coastal region was apparently used by sailors and travellers as

an orientation mark, which led to an open ended view in so far as the limits of that region were concerned and in time encompassed the whole continent. The Homeric *Hymn To Apollo of Pythia*, possibly from the 7th century BC, confirms that idea of growth from a little area into a continent. It specifies: 'They who live in fertile Peloponnesus and they who populate Europe and the seagirt islands'. Here the region is already enlarged to the whole area above the Peloponnesus, without indicating a northern frontier. Later on, in the 3rd century BC, Eratosthenes is convinced that the Greeks named the three continents wrongly because they only looked at their own country and what lay directly opposite.

As mentioned the first Greek philosopher and geographer known to have used the name Europe for the northern area of the habitable world, which corresponded with the area of our continent, is Hecataeus from Miletus at the end of the 6th century BC. He divides the habitable world into a relatively warm zone, Asia including Libya, and a relatively cool zone, Europe. He is the first to indicate the river Tanais (Don) and the Cimmerian Bosphorus (sea of Azov) as the land-frontier between Asia and Europe. Although Hecataeus was born in the Greek town Miletus in Asia Minor, he and his successors never tried to include their Asian coastal area in Europe. A first allusion to the ancient 'tripartition' of the habitable world appears about two generations later. The poet Pindar, from the 5th century BC, writes in his *Pythian IX*, when he refers to the abduction of Cyrene by Apollo to Libya: '[...] to inhabit the third fixed continent of earth'.

The relation between the names of the continent and the myth we find in Herodotus, 484-424 BC, in his descriptions of the Persian wars against Greece. Apparently, he mentions the general held opinion of his time that the Phoenician Europa was the namegiver of the continent, but he does not believe it. In his book IV he writes: 'Europa was an Asiatic and never ever set foot on the land which the Greeks now call Europe'. Crete was considered to be part of Asia by the ancient Greeks. Maybe in order to find a more European personification for Europe, Hippias, 460-400 BC, indicated a little bit later as namegiver for the continent the Oceanide Europa, who was mentioned by Hesiod in his *Theogony*. Being related to the river Europus, she was part and parcel of the continent called Europe.

In the 3rd century BC the isolated position of Crete during the classical Greek period changed. Cretan towns actively sought alliances with Greek city-states and had close relations with Hellenistic Egypt and Alexandria. In this period Crete became more European and the idea that the Phoenician Europa never

came further than Crete was not considered a problem anymore and certainly not for the Alexandrians. For example Callimachus, 305-240 BC, head of the Alexander Library, indicated Europa, mother of Minos, again as namegiver of the continent. This assumption has been followed ever since by most authors and commentators. The Phoenician Europa was an obvious symbol of the flow of knowledge and culture, which had come from the East to Europe. It passed from the Ionian Greek settlements on the Asian coast, Homer, Hecataeus, to Athens, Boeotia and the other Greek city-states.

The political interpretation of Europe starts with Herodotus. In his *History* Asia and Europe are represented as political and military powers with a history of animosity.

Henceforth they ever looked upon the Greeks as their open enemies. For Asia with all the various tribes of barbarians that inhabit it, is regarded by the Persians as their own; but Europe and the Greek race they look on as distinct and separate.

The progress of the Asian society in Europe was halted by the Greeks at the battle of Marathon and the sea-battle in the straits of Salamis. Nevertheless, the Peloponnesian fraternity war and its aftermath made Aristotle rather cynical about the political and military capabilities of Europe. In his *Politeia* he reflects: 'The peoples of Europe are very brave [...] but they miss political organization and are not capable of commanding their neighbours'. It could be a modern press comment on Europe's divide on Iraq.

#### 4. Europe Shifting to the West

The Roman Empire was confronted in her eastern regions by a centuries' old Hellenistic culture, going back to Alexander the Great. The Greek culture was largely assimilated by the Romans. This Greco-Roman culture prevailed over the existing primitive cultures of the western European regions of the empire. In the West, Latin became the language of communication in word and writing. It brought with it the Latinised Greek mythology and religion, the Greek and Roman philosophers and poets, Greek arts and the first European wide accepted money-units, the Greek drachma and the Roman denarius. Local monetary-units remained in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. Cretan coins with the Europa-theme, date back from the 5th century BC. But there are

also coins with Europa and the bull from Thracia and Anatolia from the 2nd century AD onwards.

Already in the time of ancient Greece mythological scenes had been used to beautify vases, and had been made subjects for marble and bronze statues and terra-cotta scenes. From early on, that is from the 7th century BC, images of Europa and bull-Zeus, in all the different arts and expressions of that time, have been found and have been described. Romans had imported Greek vases decorated with the Europa-myth. Roman artists used the theme, although Zeus was now called Jupiter. The theme was popularised by the writings of Ovidius, in particular as described in his *Metamorphoses*, a book that has been issued and translated throughout the ages over and over again up to our modern times. He continued to name Agenor as father of Europa, a name which showed up in the 4th century BC. Horatius, Roman's most elegant poet, wrote in his *Ode to Galathea*, Europa's anguish during her sea crossing on the back of the bull. Ending with the admonition of Venus: 'Cease thy sobs! Learn to bear becomingly thy great destiny! A part of the earth shall take thy name'.

The Roman Empire brought the Pax Romana but also all the cruelties of warfare and its aftermath. Similar to our Greek and Roman treasures in our museums, the Romans could not resist bringing their trophies from Greece and surroundings back to Rome. Cicero in his *Orations* attacks Verres, administrator of Sicily, for the plundering of old Greek statues: 'Against what price, could you believe in all conscience, could [...] the Tarentians renounce their Europa on the bull'. Roman villas appeared all over the empire, richly decorated with frescos and mosaics. Many of them with the image of Europa and the bull have survived. Not only from Pompeii and Herculaneum but also as floor mosaics of Roman villas found in France, (Arles, Nîmes), in Spain (Mérida, Cordoa, Ecija), in Austria-Salzburg, in England (Kent, Avon, London).

The relation between the continent Europe and its personification with the Phoenician princess, expressed so eloquently by Horatius, appears to fade with the passing of time. It became more a synonym for a new beginning, such as marriage and even for the passing into the other world. On old gravestones representations of the theme have been found. The myth became vulgarised by turning it into a popular theatre show, for which real bulls were trained in the West Roman capital of Ravenne.

Europe as a geo-political entity is during the Roman era closely related with the

Roman Empire. Seneca, 465 AD, identifies Europe's boundaries with the Danube and the Rhine, the frontiers of the Roman empire: 'The Danube stops the incursions of the Sarmatians and separates Europe from Asia'. Some considered only two continents Asia and Europe. Africa is considered to be part of Europe, probably, as a consequence of the conquest of Carthago. Still in the 4th century AD Claudius Claudianus wrote after the Roman victory against the African insurgent Gildo: 'We have joined Europe again with Africa'. Meanwhile the personification of the continent Europe with the daughter of Agenor was kept alive by poets such as Horace and Marcus Manilius. The latter wrote in his *Astronomica*:

'The rest of the world belongs to Europa. [...] The god bestowed the girl's name on the shore [...] Which by that title he consecrated as a memorial for his love.'

## 5. Europe in the Middle Ages

The Christian era posed a problem for the Greco-Roman mythology. Ovidius and Horace were still well read by the educated classes. Saint Augustine exposed the incredibility of mythological tales in his *Civitate Deis*:

'During those years Europa is said to have been carried off [...], but (even worshippers of these gods) assign to unsubstantial fiction the story of Jupiter (and Europa), a theme that moves poets to song, the theatre to applause and people to make holiday.'

But Christianity also gave the continent again a sense of community, particularly when it was invaded in Spain and the south of France by the North-African Moslem sultanate. In an anonymous Mozarab chronicle of 754, the armies of Charles Martel at the battle of Poitiers in 732 are described as 'Europenses'. His grandson, Charlemagne, tried to restore the West Roman Empire and was crowned emperor in 800 by the pope in Rome. He had a world map engraved on a silver table, on which the then known tripartite division of the world would have been shown with Europe, Asia and Africa. Charlemagne's advisor, the scholarly bishop of Lyon wanted a unified Christian law for the Empire against the existing enormous diversity of laws.

The attacks of Christian authors on Greek and Roman heathen religions and mythology supported the existing one state-religion, but the mythological stories did not really disappear. Consequently, just as the Greek did marry Zeus with the older non-Greek goddesses, so did the Christian authors start to absorb the Greek myths into their Christian theology. The still popular *Metamorphoses*

from Ovidius were issued with religious comments and interpretations. John of Garland (Gerlandia), circa 1195-1272, commented Ovidius in his *Ars Lectoria Ecclesie*. Interpreting the Europa-myth, he explains that the bull represents the Lamb of God, called Christ, who bears all the sins of the world. The continent identified with Christianity found in the mythical Europe her representation. She became the carrier of the sole of humanity, which in her corporal shape had to cope with the dangers of the world by traversing the sea on the back of the bull. According to Huizinga there existed in the whole of Christian Europe a conviction that all things and tales would be absurd if their significance would end in their immediate function and appearance; in fact that all things have a meaning in the other world.

In between, the *Metamorphoses* from Ovidius was being vulgarised in the various European regional languages, thus contributing to the propagation of the Europe-myth. First in German between 1190 and 1250; in Italian in 1334; in French from the beginning of the 14th century; in English in 1480; in Spanish in 1545 and in Dutch in 1552. Many of these editions are illustrated first with engravings in wood, later by copper-engravings. Europe and the bull appear regularly. The naked or half-naked Europe of the Roman and Hellenistic period is now replaced by a modest young girl, decently dressed with a frock up to her neck. She looks demurely upwards to heaven from where all salvation is to be expected. She does not show any agitation not of anguish nor of corporal desire, she represents the Christian values.

The identification of Europe with Christianity finds a strong expression in the events of the crusades. In between the spirits of idealism and its degeneration into brutality, there were armies of Europeans living for years brotherly together through foul and fair. In its wave several Orders of Knights were established, who fought at the frontiers of Europe against the Arabs, the Turks, the Spanish Caliphats, sailed with the Portuguese discoverers and established themselves at the north-eastern frontiers of Europe. They were the first European brigades subsidised by the monarchs of Europe.

Europa as personification of the continent continues to be mentioned by philosophers and authors describing the state of knowledge of their time. Isidorus, bishop of Seville (570-636) creates some confusion when he says in his *Etymologiae* that Europe, daughter of Agenor, was brought from Africa, instead of Asia, to Crete, and that the third of the world was named after her. Typically, the Libyan or African descent of Europe remained limited to the authors of the

Middle Ages. For them the continent was Christian and so was her representation, princess Europa.

## 6. Nation-states and the Rebirth of the Greek Classics

The Renaissance started in Italy and with the passing of time spread over the whole of Europe. The Ancient Greek language was again being studied, the arts became lively and in paintings emotions and perspective became important. Europe's regained cultural and intellectual freedom finds an expression in a painting by Maarten de Vos, 1572; a fully naked Europa guides with two hands on the horns, the bull, leading him to her own destiny. She is looking back disapprovingly to the submissive, still fully dressed maiden on the coast. Different artistic interpretations of the Europa-myth became fashionable. Albrecht Dürer, 1471-1528 draws a resolute, about naked, Europa straight on her knees on the bull's back. An emotional and frightened Europa lying almost naked on the back of the bull is from Titian, 1490-1576. The number of painters and sculptors using the subject is enormous. To name a few, there are, Tintoretto, le Lorain, Velázquez, Rubens, Jordaens, Rembrandt, Tischbein, Tiepolo, Benjamin West, Poussin, Anthony van Dyck, all using their own view and artistic expression of the Europa-myth. An example is Veronese who represented Europa as a queen, identifying and limiting Europe to the elegant circles of their societies. It is important to note that these artists, rendering the Europa myth, cover about all the nationalities of the European countries.

In literature the French Pleïade-poet group sang the praise of Europa, Rabelais mocked Jupiter's adventure. The Englishman E. Spencer reflected the sentiments painted by Titian: The myth is quoted by about all the great authors in all West European countries; in most cases only the myth itself is interpreted. It will be clear that their handling of the subject was in line with the literary trends of the moment, from amorous poetry of Boccaccio and Petrarca; to moralistic comments by Erasmus, Thomas More, Vondel; to heroic epics from Camões and de Mena; to comedies by Shakespeare; to romantic poems and novels from J.-B. Rousseau and Voltaire; to laudatory court poems of P.D.E. Lebrun; to satirical interpretations from Lessing and Bürger. Some like the Italian poet G.B. Marino in his *The Whispering Wind*, remember her explicitly as namegiver of the continent:

'Then in eternal memory, Europa with her name was given,  
To the most beautiful region of the world, the most noble part [...]

In this period of nation-states the Europa-myth was often used for national political pretences of grandeur. For the bronze doors of the Vatican St. Peter architect Filarete designed the bronze-relief of the Europe-myth around 1440. Is this a reference to the papal ambitions to hold the, at least religious, sceptre over the whole of Europe? Jacopo Palma painted for Venice a threatening lion of Venice against the rest of Europe in the league of Cambrai in 1508. Europa on the bull carries a helmet and a shield. Venice, as last remnant of the Byzantine era in Western Europe, felt itself superior. In memory of the election of Charles the fifth to emperor in 1519 a series of nine Brussels tapestries 'Los Honores' are ordered. On one of the tapestries 'Fortuna' his realm is indicated by Europa riding stately the bull. With the marriage of Charles IX of France and Elisabeth of Austria in 1570, the entry-arch in Paris was decorated with Europa and the bull with the accompanying text:

'As Jupiter ravished Europa, so the Dauphin from this marriage, through which Europe is joint, will ravish Asia [...]

It appears that all the crowned heads of Europe still carry the old dream of a unified Europe in their thoughts, but limit the idea to their personal profit. A quality which up to this day we have not been able to rid ourselves from. In England, a publication by John Dee in 1577 on the art of navigation showed a front emblem with Queen Elisabeth on a ship called Europe. Beside it on the waves Europa rides the swimming bull. The British ambitions are still centred on her old influence on the other side of the Canal. Cardinal Richelieu wrote with Desmaretz de St. Sorlin an allegorical comedy *Europe*. All the personalities, representing countries, covet Europa. Richelieu, in his last years, appears here far in advance of his time. At the end of the play France invites Germany to unite with each other. Germany answers:

'Peace, I accept, we are akin, French and Germans from same origin:  
We have the same heaven, morals, laws [...]

The play ends with the moral that in Europe countries should not dominate each other. An early prelude of the present French-German relationship.

The murderous Thirty Years' War proved that Europe was still far from peace. An engraving by Cornelis Visscher at the end of those years of war showed



Europe looking like Minerva, sitting upon the bull, as an allegory of one of four continents with the motto *Evropa Orbata Lvgens* (Europa Laments the Massacred). In spite of the break-up of Europe in states with different religions, the feeling of belonging to one cultural entity apparently stayed alive. When Ortelius published one of the first realistic maps of the world, his European map carried as symbol Europa sitting on a lying bull.

It is only when a common enemy threatens that Europe comes alive politically. Europe in that time was under continuing threat of the Turks. The Venetian possessions on Crete with the town of Candie (Heraklion) were under siege in 1669. France, Spain and Austria came with a fleet to the rescue. An engraving of Jean Le Pautre shows Europa seated on the bull with in her hand a model of Candie. In Eastern Europe the Turks attacked after hundred years Vienna in 1683 for a second time. In reply, the Holy League was formed to push them beyond the Hungarian planes. An anonymous engraving shows Europa on the bull, carrying a shield with the Holy cross, crushing the Crescent. In France Louis XIV, forgetting Richelieu's council, had big plans for Europe. An alliance under the English king William III of Orange against him was the reaction. At the official reception at The Hague at the return of stadhouder and king William in 1691 triumphal arches had been placed with the image of Europa and the bull. The accompanying text says *Eripe raptoré miseram: Wrest me, Wretch (Europe) from the violence of the abductor (Louis XIV)*. Again the common feeling to be part of a greater entity, Europe, comes here alive.

Amazingly, among all these war vagaries, their remained places and time to study the art of music, to perform and enjoy it. From the 16th century onwards the Europa theme is set on music. *Felice Europa*, a madrigal dedicated to the Europa myth by Andrea Gabrieli is staged in Venice in 1589. The first opera based on the theme *Europa rapita da Giove* is introduced in Bologna in 1623. The British John Eccles composed the music for the libretto *The rape of Europa* by Peter Motteux with a first performance in Dorset Garden, London in 1694 under the reign of William III of Orange. The subject was also treated as a cantata by the French court composer Bernier on the basis of the poem of J-B. Rousseau; an original dialogue between immortal lover Jupiter and mortal Europa. And there are pantomimes, and more cantata and opera's created in France, Germany, Italy, Austria. Antonio Salieri, Mozart's opponent in the last film on his life, composed *Europa Reconoscinte*, for the first time executed in Vienna in 1776. The Muse Euterpe, another symbol of European culture, cherished her Greek sister's memory.

## 7. Europe in the 19th Century

The treaty of Vienna of 1815 fixed the boundaries of national states and those of the European continent. After the defeat of a unified Napoleonic Europe, the ideas about Europe on the basis of a league of nations fitted more in the trend of nation-building of that era. It was an era of bourgeois idealism and romanticism. In literature and the plastic arts the Europa myth continued to figure as the representation of a political Europe.

In France the 'Empirical' style of the Napoleons were reflected in the neo-classicists revival and later followed by the poets called 'Les Parnassiens'. André Chenier, interpreted the famous Greek poems of Anacreon and Moschos. The pure poetry of Le Conte de Lisle in his poem *Europe* should be mentioned. From the romantics quoting and using the Europa myth there are Heinrich Heine and Yeats in a cynical way, the Dutchman Bilderdijk in rhythmic rolling verses, Rimbaud sensual and symbolic, Tennyson dreamy and exhaltic, de Vere a poem in double syllable rhyme, the Spanish Rubén Darío referring to the placing of Europa's bull as a constellation in the Zodiac. Victor Hugo is the most verbal in his writings in favour of a United States of Europe. He supported the review *Etats-Unis d'Europe* and the ideas of Saint Simon and Giuseppe Mazzini. But in his reference he writes: 'The white bull carries her off. Europa, without hope'. The British Walter Savage Landor gave a new and original interpretation of the myth. In his *The Ancient Idyl* he presented a dialogue between Europa and her mother. It was the first time that Europa's mother appeared on the scene. Miguel Melendres from Catalan wanted us to believe that Jupiter preferred the beauty of Tarragona above Europa. The French Louis Boulhet indicates in his poem *Europe* the expectations and hopes of Europe's youth in the future: 'But you are, across the immensity without scale [...] On that bellowing bull, called the Future [...]'.

The artistic rendering of the Europa theme was more and more determined by the way the artist applied his painting techniques and by his approach to his subjects in general. In William Turner's painting, Europa and the bull almost disappear in the mist hanging over the sea, reflecting Europe's misty future. Gustave Moreau accentuates the symbolism of the theme by adding two beams radiating from the bull's head, indicating his divine origin; is the future of Europe depending on spiritual powers? Schutzenberger paints a theatrical Europa on the bull. The bull keeps the idea of a Europe just floating. Buonaventura Genelli gives a pure romantic picture of a triumphant Europa on the bull welcomed

by Poseidon in his chariot with winged horses encircled by nymphs on seahorses and other sea-creatures; a triumphal birth of Europe. Paul Gauguin brings the image in the style of his Oceanian period; reflecting Europe's influence on the other continents. The romantic conception predominates the depiction of the Europa myth executed in porcelain, bronze, mantle piece clocks or cast-iron hearth plates. Porcelain and earthenware examples are found throughout Europe, from Sweden over Italy to Cyprus, and from Great Britain to Hungary, keeping the same idea of Europe alive in all its countries. Around the turn of the century the European emancipation movement is reflected in the Europa myth by a reversal of roles. Not bull-Zeus but Europa dominates and seduces the bull. Like on the engravings from R. Müller, A. Müntzer, H. Vogeler, P. Franck and the bronzes of Fritz Behn and Carl Milles.

In the musical arts Europe continued to inspire composers and librettists. The Austrian Joseph Weigl the younger composed the cantata *Il riposo della Europa*. The German poet Heinrich Heine incorporated Europa and Jupiter in his ballet scenario *Doctor Faust*. A satirical 'singspiel' written by the Slovenian Karl Meisl in 1816 called *The goings on at Olympos* and included the Europa theme. It was set on music by Wenzel Müller. In the last century, the French take the theme over from the German/Austrian colleagues. Darius Milhaud composed a chamber-opera of nine minutes *The Abduction of Europe* with the libretto from his friend and French diplomat Henri Hoppenot written in 1927, in which she turns away of the military and its hierarchy. Of course, Europa was included in the ballet *Les Amours de Jupiter* with choreography by Roland Petit, music from Jacques Ibert and libretto from the French-Russian Boris Kochno. The ballet was performed in Paris in 1946.

An opera-buffa *Europa ontvoerd* was composed by the Belgian-Flemish Karel Albert, with the libretto from Joseph Weterings in 1949. The well-known French adventurer and writer Régis Debray wrote a basis for a ballet for the choreographer Maurice Béjart for the 1992 World Exposition in Seville of 1992. His scenario was adapted for a opera by composer F. de Orador in 1998.

In the end the many ideas and initiatives towards a politically organised Europe had to give way to growing nationalistic tendencies and nation-building, exploding in the World War of 1914-18.

## 8. *Political Europe in the 20th Century*

During the first half of the twentieth century the representation of Europe became even more popular as a supporting symbolism for partisans and antagonists of the most humane and inhumane ideas. For the marriage of the German Crown Prince in 1904 Adolph Amberg of the Berlin china-ware factory made an impressive table-piece of a wedding-procession of about twenty figurines. On the one side the Crown Prince, dressed as a Roman Caesar on horseback accompanied by representatives of different nations on foot. On the other side the bride, Cecilie zu Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in the shape of a proud, upright sitting Europa on the bull. The aggressive political implication of this marriage gift of the city of Berlin does not need any further explanation. In 1909 appears the review *Simplicissimus*, Munich 15th of March with a title-page of Europa and the bull. Prince George of Serbia waves a red flag in front of the bull. The text expresses his powerless political influence on the European scene: 'To govern, I have no talents and as a torero I don't have a chance'. A lithograph by Ritter von Finetti, named *Europa 1915* shows Europa, dressed in fashionable Jugendstil, trying to hold on to a bull run wild. An iron medal from 1917 by Karl Goetz depicts a crying Europa on a bull springing into a wood of raised bayonets. During the Nazi period the Europa theme was used to glorify the 1937 'Day of German Art' in Munich and during the 1943 European youth Congress in Wien, where the myth was set up in large decorative figures. Max Beckmann, in reaction to the rise of Nazi-fascism painted an obituary of Europa, lying lifeless crosswise over the bull's back. The life-size bronze of the American Paulanship is a frozen picture of love; is it America's relation with the old continent?

In this century, the caricature lifted the art of political satire to the summit. In 1939 Oscar Garvens designs in the German revue *Kladderatsch* a Europa with a gasmask on top of a bull enveloped in an armoured tank. It is a satire against the rearmament of France. After the Second World War starved Europe and the American aid and supremacy was pointedly rendered by Mirko Szewczuk in *Die Zeit* of 3 February 1949. A naked shameless Europa riding a lying tin of cornered beef; the text 'the bull cornered'.

With the start of the European Communities in 1958 the name Europe obtained still another interpretation. Horst Haitzinger in *Simplicissimus* of 7 July 1962 expressed Europe's impatience with de Gaulle's old fashioned nationalism. Europa turns the tables and takes the bull with the head of the Gaulle on her

shoulders; 'My patience is gone', says Europa. The Belgian Gerard Alsteens draws in *Knack* during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations of 1992 Europa on the bull with his hind legs in a snail shell heading for social Europe. *Le Monde* in March 1996 had a design by Plantu. Europa on a stumbling cow with Delors behind her saying 'I fear a mad-Europe illness'. The Dutch *Financieel Dagblad* has in March 2001 15 Europa's fighting on the back of the bull by Peter Vos. And so Europa and the bull have become the preferred identification of the European Union showing the desperate struggle against outdated nationalistic tendencies.

## 9. Cultural Europe in the 20th Century

The Europa theme is more and more used in literature and other arts. At the beginning of the century the Dutch writer Louis Couperus describes the beautiful Roman mosaic found in Arles in his *Het Koninkrijk Arles*. In 1939 the Italian Massimo Bontempelli, wrote the novel *Viaggio d'Europa* with three drawings by the painter Robert Pudlich; a German translation is from Bettina Seipp. The well-known German writer Heinrich Böll modernized the myth in his *Er kam als Bierfahrer* of 1969. Zeus is a Greek immigrant, named Taurus and being a beer porter is called 'bull'. He meets Europa, a foreign electronic engineer in Aachen. She does not like present day technical culture. Attracted by nature, when they meet at the end, he says: 'let's go', and they disappear in the woods.

The French-Belgian Marguerite de Crayencour (Yourcenar) has the Europa myth appear in her *Mémoires d'Hadrien* of 1951. In the modern *Odysseus*, a long poem of the Greek poet Nikos Kazantzakis the Europa myth is of course referred to. The British Ruth Rendell, fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, is highly regarded as a crime novelist. In her *A Fatal Inversion* under the pseudonym Barbara Vine, she mentions the terrace of Wyvis Hall with statuary, representing the loves of Zeus: 'As a child he had studied them with fascination, inquiring what the bull was doing to the lady, and receiving from his parents no very satisfying answer [...]'. Several British and Irish poets took the Europa myth as subject for their poems. There are W.R. Roberts, William Plomer and American poets such as R.P. Blackmur, R.G. Humphries, Charles Olson. They focus more on the psychological sexual drift behind the myth. The Jamaican Nobel laureate Derek Walcott interpreted the myth as a play of light and clouds and ends:

'Then [...] like drops still quivering on his matted hide,  
The hooves and horn points anagrammed in stars.'

The British poet Douglas Dunn in his poem *Europa's Lover*, philosophises over Europa being the mother of Europe. He quotes Albert Camus 'Our Europe is not yours', from his *Lettres à un ami allemand* during the Second World War. In the more popular genre the German theatre player and television performer wrote a small laconic poem, that finishes with a political undertone:

'At first the girl was quite at ease - Then less - then a bit more appease  
Then even Zeus clearly found - How disunited Europe sound  
And it is not at all wrong - To say, it has stayed that way all along.'

The manifold artistic trends of the twentieth century in painting and other plastic arts are surely reflected in the Europa theme used by these artists. The painted Europa by the Swiss Pierre Bonnard is impressionistic with a tendency to the Fauves. His Europa sits huddled, naked and despairingly on the bulls back, reflecting the loss in human values after the First World War. At the height of the economic boom of 1929 Europa is sculpted by Antoine Bourdelle lying relaxed on the bull, looking straight ahead confident of the future. The Cobra group is represented by the Dutchman Constant (C. A. Nieuwenhuys); the cubist style by the French André Lhote showing a determined Europa steering towards her own future. There are interpretations by Picasso, who shows Europa handling a knife, a dreaming Europa of Salvador Dalí, a romantic Europa by Matisse, an apocalyptic vision of Max Ernst, a relaxed Europa lying on the back of the bull by Aristide Maillol. Gern Arntz, designer of pictographic statistics, illustrated a German edition of Ovidius' *Metamorphoses* with the Europa scene. From Georges Braque is an engraving and pen drawing. Hans Erni made an abstract drawing of the scene. Two colour-lithographs and an oil are signed by Lovis Corinth, the latter showing a playful Europe and friends around the bull.

The sculptors rendering the Europa myth in small bronzes have become numerous. Modern larger statues to be found in public places are not to be neglected. The Swede Carl W.E. Milles sculpted a bronze fountain of Europa on the bull for the market in Halmstad. In Bamberg square, Bavaria one can admire a huge statue of the Spanish expressionist Fernando Botero, with a copy at the Madrid airport. In Brusells Olivier Strebelle made the Europa scene in a fountain of ceramics. The French sculptress Claude Lalanne sculpted Europa on the bull in stone. The Dutch sculptor Ek van Zanten has a bronze, nude Europa lying at full length fondly against the skin of the bull's back at Heemstede, Netherlands. A very stylised prone bull with Europa of concrete lies at the entrance of the Hungarian artists village Szentendre near Budapest.

In commemoration of the entry of Spain into the European Union in 1986, the Spanish sculptor A. Teno executed for the town Nerja a frightened Europa on the back of the bull emerging out of the waves. In Hertogenbosch, Netherlands, Marius van Beek has Europa standing behind the bull with two 0 in her high raised hands ready to attack. The inscription says 'Europa will not let herself be abducted'.

Europe's representation in the myth of Europa and Zeus the bull is expressed in many more different ways. The Europa scene is found on stamps of many countries, Crete, Greece, Spain, Poland, Sweden, the UK, Switzerland and France. In the movie of Jean Cocteau *Le sang d'un Poète* enters a lady riding a bull with on his skin a map of Europe. Before the beginning of the third millennium the city of Brussels organised a baroque Carousel, a combination of opera, Spanish school riding, and tournament. Lady Europa dressed in Roman white attire opens the cortège mounted on a live-bull. A beautiful modern tapestry from Aubusson with the Europa theme by Marque Petit hangs in an office of the city of Strasbourg. In the end each culture or civilisation gets always involved with certain types of money. In Europe from the ancient Greeks onwards money was coined in bronze, silver or gold. Some carried Europa and the bull. In our time there is the 5 DM not of 1948 and in Cyprus a 50 centimes piece is still in circulation. And the Euro? Luckily, to Greece of course, goes the honour of introducing the 2 Euro coin with Europa and the bull.

## *Final Note*

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The existence of a European culture is self-evident. The Greco-Roman era is European, the Middle Ages are European, the Renaissance, Baroque is European; the romantic-democratic movements of the 19th century are European; the inhumane World Wars of the first half of the 20th century are of European making; the European Union is our responsibility towards our children and to humanity world-wide. Trends in western literature are European; developments in western painting are European; non-plastic arts do not know inter-European frontiers; the setting of music and its theory of evolution is European. The three thousand year-old tradition of using the symbol of that continent in all her cultural activities forms a modest but telling tale of this common cultural heritage.

The ancient Greeks and Romans represent the myth itself, only in literature the link between the myth and the continent are made. In the Middle Ages representations and interpretations of the Europa myth stand for the soul of the Christians, who are identified with Europe. During the Renaissance images and literature concerning the myth reflect the regained freedom of expression and intellectual ideas; the political symbolism of the myth is one of its expressions. With the passing into the Baroque versions and dramatisation of the Europa myth the same ideas of exuberance of expression come through as well as deep religious feelings evident for this era. Images and reflections of the Romantic period with its variety of applications be it rural, nationalistic, revolutionary or anarchistic find again a response in the treating of the subject of the myth. The 20th century with its magnitude of artistic trends, of ever changing political and institutional situations, is the basis for an outburst of images, of interpretations in prose, poetry or set on music and in political symbolism popularised by the caricatures in the daily and weekly press. The general political message is clear, more Europe, better organised and showing greater unity.

We all eat with our fork left and knife in the right hand. A discussion over which culture is stronger, the national or the European has no meaning. Europeans will always have several layers of loyalties, of culture. This translates itself politically in national and European interests, organised in a dualistic Federation. The efficiency of such a dual Federation is the question to be solved now.



# An Emerging European Public Sphere? What We Know, And How To Make Sense Of It<sup>1</sup>

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**Thomas Risse<sup>2</sup>**

## 1. Introduction

A lively political and academic debate has emerged about the normative viability and the empirical possibility of a European public sphere. This debate is directly linked to the controversy about the democratic or legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU). There is general agreement that modern democracies rely upon multiple channels of intermediation between private actors in civil society and public authorities in order to insure the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. In this context, an open, pluralist, and critical public discourse rooted in independent media is considered crucial for providing an interface between state and society in a democratic polity. If we conceive of the EU as an emerging democratic polity beyond the nationstate, the issue of a European public sphere is raised quite naturally.

Yet, there is little agreement in the literature on what constitutes a democratic public sphere (*demokratische Öffentlichkeit*), let alone a European public

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sphere – and how do we know one when we see one. As a result, different conceptualizations lead to diverging assessments about whether there is a transnational public sphere in Europe in an empirical sense and, if the answer is no, whether something resembling such a sphere could actually emerge in principle. Different concepts of a public sphere inevitably result in different empirical indicators how to measure it which leads to almost incompatible empirical data.

This paper tries to make sense of the empirical and theoretical literature by asking two questions:

1. What do we know empirically about a European public sphere?
2. How can we make sense of the empirical findings in light of the theoretical debate on a European public sphere?

The short answer to the first question is somewhat paradoxical: the available evidence suggests that the salience of European themes is still low, but that similar meaning structures and frames of reference prevail in media reporting about Europe. The short answer to the second question is that a European public sphere emerges out of the interconnection of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres. An ideal typical European public sphere would then be characterized by

- a comparatively high degree of attention to European themes in the national media;
- similar frames of reference with regard to European affairs in media reporting about Europe and the EU indicating an emerging ‘community of communication’.

Linking theory and evidence, we can then conclude that we can see an emerging European ‘community of communication’, the more salient European themes become in the various national public spheres.

## 2. What Do We Know About a European Public Sphere?

Systematic empirical research about a European public sphere and about cross-national media reporting about European affairs is still in its infancy. In other words, the theoretical and normative debate on a European public sphere and a European communication space far outpaces our empirical knowledge about these themes. Moreover, there is little agreement in the literature on what constitutes a European public sphere (see below). As a result, different empirical studies use different criteria and, as a result, come to different conclusions as to the (non-) existence of a European public sphere.

However, two apparently contradictory findings are worth reporting here:

1. Some measure a European public sphere by counting how often 'Europe', 'European institutions', or 'European affairs' are mentioned in the media.<sup>3</sup> The result is almost inevitably that European questions pale in comparison with national, regional, or local issues. A recent cross-national study comparing media reporting on national, European, and global affairs seems to indicate that 'Europe' only matters in media reporting on monetary questions, agricultural issues, and, of course, on issues of European integration itself.<sup>4</sup> However, there is increasing evidence that the salience of European issues in media reporting increased considerably during the late 1990s.<sup>5</sup> This work, therefore, concludes: There is only a limited European public sphere to speak of in a meaningful sense given the rather low issue salience.
2. Others concentrate on particular European issues, such as the corruption scandal of the European Commission, BSE, or the debate about the future of the European Union (EU).<sup>6</sup> These studies tend to observe that these European

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3 e.g. Jürgen Gerhards, 'Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit', in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 22, 1993, pp. 96-110; Jürgen Gerhards, 'Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit', in: M. Bach (ed.), *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Sonderheft 40 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp. 277-305.

4 Ruud Koopmans, personal communication.

5 Hans-Jörg Trenz, *Media Coverage on European Governance. Testing the Performance of National Newspapers*, EUSA Eighth Biannual International Conference (Nashville TN: 27-29 March 2003).

6 e.g. Klaus Eder, *Von der Herausbildung europäischer Elitenöffentlichkeit zur Europäisierung nationaler Öffentlichkeit. Bedingungen und Wirkungen einer Expansion von Öffentlichkeit in Europa*, Antrag an die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (München and Berlin, 1998); Klaus Eder, 'Zur Transformation nationalstaatlicher Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Von der

issues are discussed in the various media across Europe in a very similar fashion and using similar reference points. Our own study on media reporting about the European reaction to the new Austrian government (the 'Haider debate') shows very strongly, that newspapers in five different countries used very similar meaning structures (frames) in discussing the issue. This was irrespective of one's particular stance on the issue. In this case, we could clearly observe a 'community of communication'.<sup>7</sup> As a result, these types of studies are usually more optimistic with regard to the existence of a European public sphere, since they observe many more commonalities.

So, who is right? There is no easy answer, since the two types of studies measure different aspects of what could be a European public sphere. On the one hand, the first measurement refers to the significance or salience of European affairs, as compared to local, regional, national, or global questions. If media pay little or no attention to the EU, the public awareness of European questions is equally low, hence the scepticism about a European public sphere. On the other hand, the second type of measurement refers to common meaning structures and frames of reference. If media report about Europe and the EU at all, they seem to do so using similar frames and meanings; in other words, they have a similar understanding of what it is that they talk about, irrespective of their political standpoint. We might disagree about how we judge the Commission's corruption scandal, but we all agree that corruption is bad behavior.

Putting the two findings together then leads to a paradoxical result: The national media do not report about Europe and the EU as often as policy-makers in Brussels would like them to do, but if they do report, they use similar perspectives irrespective of national backgrounds. The following graph summarizes this finding:

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Sprachgemeinschaft zur issuespezifischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft', in: *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2000, pp. 167-184; Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, 'Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik der Rede vom Öffentlichkeitsdefizit', in: M. Bach (ed.), *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Sonderheft 40 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp. 306-331; Hans-Jörg Trencz, 'Korruption und politischer Skandal in der EU. Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen politischen Öffentlichkeit', in: M. Bach (ed.), *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Sonderheft 40 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp. 332-359.

7 Marianne Van de Steeg et al., *The EU as a Political Community. A Media Analysis of the 'Haider Debate' in the European Union*, EUSA Eighth Biannual International Conference (Nashville TN: 27-30 March 2003).

**Graph 1: Dimensions of a European Public Sphere and Empirical Findings**

<i>Media Attention for European Affairs</i>	HIGH	LOW
<i>Frames of Reference in Media Reporting on European Affairs</i>		
SIMILAR	Ideal typical European public sphere	Current empirical findings
DIFFERENT	Prevailing national perspectives on Europe	No European public sphere

### 3. How to Make Sense of a European Public Sphere?

What do these results tell us about the (non-) existence of a European public sphere? Conventional wisdom holds that there is no European public sphere, because there is no ‘community of communication’ on the European level based on a common language and genuinely European media. This suggests that we must somehow transcend our national public spheres and that a ‘European public sphere’ is somehow located above and beyond the various national media and publics. In concrete terms, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Le Monde* could never be part of the same public sphere, by definition. But there is no reason why we should all speak the same language and all use the same media in order to be able to communicate across national borders in a meaningful way. If people attach similar meanings to what they observe in Europe, they should be able to communicate across borders irrespective of language and in the absence of European-wide media. Thus, the findings reported above disconfirm conventional wisdom.

Moreover, the conventional view is based on an idealized picture of an almost homogenous national public sphere which is then transferred to the European level. There is no reason why we should expect agreement or consensus on an issue in a common public sphere. Agreement about European policies across boundaries, ideological, and other cleavages cannot serve as an indicator for the existence of non-existence of a European public sphere. The same holds true for support levels for European integration. One could even argue that the lively debates in France, Britain, and Denmark about whether or not to join Euroland at least show that people care about Europe, in comparison to the silencing of such debates which we witnessed in Germany, Italy, or among other staunch supporters of the Euro.

In short, contestation might be a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere rather than an indicator for its absence. The more contentious European policies and politics become and the more social mobilization occurs on European issues, the more we should observe truly European public debates. If political issues are not contested, if European politics remains the business of elites, the attention level for Europe and the EU will remain low. In sum, European issues must become salient and significant in the various public debates so that a European public sphere can emerge. Politicization of European affairs would then be crucial to raise the low salience of Europe in the national media reported in the empirical studies.

Social mobilization about and contestation of European policies and politics is a necessary pre-condition for an emerging European public sphere, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. One could easily imagine social mobilization and public debates surrounding European policies within the member states that discuss these questions solely from the various national perspectives. Is joining the Euro in the British, Danish, or German national interest, or not? If the debate is solely framed in these national terms, people would still debate the same question, but the frames of reference would be totally different. A study of the Commission's corruption scandal showed, for example, that Spanish media reported it as a German attack on a Spanish Commissioner for some mean national-ist reasons. German media, in contrast, reported the issue as another proof that Southern European cultures including the Spanish one just do not understand that corruption is irreconcilable with democratic values.<sup>8</sup> While the two public spheres still observed each other, the same question meant two very different things in the two national communities.

Jürgen Gerhards is, therefore, very sceptical about the emergence of a European public sphere: 'The territorial boundaries of the public sphere are, therefore, mostly identical with the territorial boundaries of democracies, because the elected representatives of the respective people orient their communicative, public behavior to the "demos" who elected them and on whom they depend'.<sup>9</sup> In the absence of transnational interest groups, parties, and social movements, we are unlikely to see an emerging European public sphere in which the issues are discussed from a European rather than the various national perspectives.

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8 See Hans-Jörg Trezz, 'Korruption und politischer Skandal in der EU. Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen politischen Öffentlichkeit', *op. cit.*

9 Jürgen Gerhards, 'Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit', *op.cit.*, p. 292 (my translation).

The result is clear: We need to fix the democratic deficit of the EU first, before we can fix the deficit in European public sphereness. Others, however, see the emergence of a European public sphere as a pre-condition of being able to tackle the European democratic deficit. Is this then a 'hen and egg' type of problem?

And is it really necessary that we all adopt a European rather than a national viewpoint in order to be able to communicate meaningfully across borders in a European public sphere? At this point, we are back at square one: What constitutes a public sphere? Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner suggest in this context (building on Jürgen Habermas' work on public spheres) that a meaningful concept of public spheres requires that media communicate 'the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance'.<sup>10</sup> What does this mean concerning our question of a European public sphere?

First, the Eder/Kantner definition starts from the assumption that a transnational European public sphere can be built on the basis of the various national publics and media. Second, the concept implies a similarly (high) degree of issue salience across national public spheres. These two points are not controversial in the literature.

The controversy starts with the third part of the definition, 'same criteria of relevance'. On the one hand, there are those who would argue that a European public sphere requires that speakers in the sphere adopt a European rather than a national or otherwise partisan perspective (see above). There can still be controversies, but the debate would center on whether or not a particular policy is in the European rather than any other interest. On the other hand, there are those who argue that 'same criteria of relevance' simply means that we are taking notice of each other in a common public sphere, that we mutually observe each other. The example above of the German and Spanish media reporting of the Commission's corruption scandal would still qualify as one public sphere, since the two national media still observe each other.

But can we really argue that a common public sphere exists in the absence of some 'community of communication'? In particular, if we posit the existence of a common public sphere as a necessary ingredient of a democratic polity, it is inevitable to talk about a community of communication. But how can we do this without falling into the trap of simply projecting our national democratic

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10 Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, *op.cit.*, p. 315.

politics unto the European level? Are we stuck between a rock and a hard place? In other words, how much community spirit in Europe is necessary to find a European public sphere and how do we know it when we see it?

Communication in a public sphere means that speakers talk to each other and to their audiences rather than simply voicing utterances. As a result and at a minimum, speakers in a public sphere should recognize each other as legitimate participants in a debate. We might disagree fundamentally, but we take each other's statements seriously in a democratic polity. Nationalist reactions deny this legitimacy. Polarizations along national lines by definition create boundaries using nationalist 'self-other' distinctions, as in the case of the corruption scandal: *The* Germans are after *our* (Spanish) Commissioner. *The* Spanish don't know what the rule of law means. In these and other statements, the two public spheres still observe each other and they also use some common reference points. But they surely do not treat each other as legitimate speakers in one's own public sphere. There is little sense of belonging to the same 'community of communication'.

Thus, accepting other fellow Europeans as legitimate speakers in a public sphere implies that the 'we' in whose name actors speak and to whom they relate, extends beyond national boundaries. Thus, a certain degree of collective identification with Europe is necessary to treat fellow Europeans from other countries as legitimate voices in one's own national public sphere. We can call it 'identity light', since it does not imply a deep sense of loyalty toward each other, but some mini-mum sense of belonging to the same community.

But how do we know that speakers in a public sphere treat each other as legitimate participants in a debate across borders? There seem to be two ways of measuring it which we used in our project on the European public debates concerning the rise of Haider's party into the Austrian government and the European reactions to it.<sup>11</sup> First, we can find out who the 'we' is in whose name speakers communicate or to whom they refer in their utterances. We can also find out who the 'they' is against whom the community is constructed or who is treated as outside the community. To what degree is a European 'we' constructed and how does this relate to the national 'we'?

Second, it is possible to measure the degree to which national media use similar reference points, similar frames and similar meanings when reporting

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11 See paper by Marianne Van de Steeg, Valentin Rauer and Sylvain Rivet, 'An Empirical Approach to the Public Sphere in the EU', *op.cit.*



about an issue. They do not need to agree in their views on specific policies, only on the criteria or the references that are at stake here. In our analysis of the 'Haider debates' in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Austria, we found two understandings of Europe across all media and countries: 'Europe as a moral community' holding up the values of human rights and democracy, on the one hand, 'Europe as a legal community' in which the rule of law prevails, on the other. These were the two major frames in which the whole debate was carried out.<sup>12</sup> In this sense then, we found a 'community of communication' in the Haider debates.

In sum then, we can speak of a European public sphere in a meaningful sense if:

1. similar issues are communicated at the same time with the same salience or significance;
2. the speakers treat each other as legitimate voices in a community;
3. the reference points and meaning structures in which a particular policy problem is being communicated are similar across national publics.

#### *4. Linking Theory and Evidence: An Emerging European Public Sphere*

If we use these three criteria to interpret the empirical findings mentioned above, the conclusion is very clear: People do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when they do, they establish a community of communication across borders. There is not yet a stable and high issue salience of European affairs in the national public spheres. But it is remarkable that similar reference points and meaning structures emerge, as soon as people debate European issues, irrespective of one's particular viewpoint in the issue at question. There is very little evidence that media reporting about Europe and the EU varies dramatically from one national public sphere to the other, as far as the frames of interpretation are concerned. In this latter sense, media reporting about the EU is no different from their reporting about national issues and events. In sum, we can observe an emerging European public sphere.

The policy conclusion is equally clear: Many political and business leaders in Europe believe that controversial debates on Europe, the EU, and European

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12 Marianne Van de Steeg et al., *op.cit.*

policies will endanger the European integration process and slow it down considerably. Therefore, one should not touch the European elite consensus which still prevails in many, particularly Continental European countries. This belief is dangerous in democratic terms and plain wrong in empirical terms. Contestation and politicization is constitutive for a democratic polity including the European polity. And it serves a European purpose, since it is bound to increase the issue salience and significance of European affairs in the national polities. The data on frames of reference suggest that raising the salience of the EU in the national polities will not drive the Europeans apart, but pull them together in a European public sphere.

## On the Four Names

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*European Community*

*European Union*

*United Europe*

*United States of Europe*

*Etats-Unis d'Europe*

*Europe Unie*

*Union Européenne*

*Communauté Européenne*

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## Sur les Quatre Noms

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# Back to the Future: Europe as Community

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**Joseph H.H. Weiler<sup>1</sup>**

## 1. What's in a Name

It can be predicted with certainty: The New Europe, the post Convention Europe, will not, thankfully, be renamed 'The United States of Europe'. Not because of the old reason that it is too Federalist. The name is, well, too American.

What about other names?

The European construct has always been wedded to the fetish of movement and progress: The union among its peoples must be '...ever closer', never ending, like an Italian love song: *Ti amo sempre di più*. It has also been wedded to pragmatism. That, after all, was the genius of the Schuman Plan.

If one adopts, then, the *Saatchi & Saatchi* approach to Europe, the slick quest for a name that will please the 'consumers' (the powers-that-be have long stopped treating individuals as empowered and responsible citizens), a name that will signify 'Progress', 'Dynamism', the 'Future' (all concepts taken from the marketing departments of the BMWs and Alfa Romeos of this world) and even a subliminal allusion to a winning football team - we will be presented with – *United Europe*. And maybe, to complete the Advertizing Agency wet dream, we can even be served up, for the nth time, with the bare breasted mythological Europa. Not, mind you, the United States of Europe – but the very, very different United Europe, the perfect name to express our hidden desire to be, after all, as powerful as the Americans whilst maintaining our less hidden desire to demonstrate how different we are from them.

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Can you think of anything less banal?

Well yes, you can. The European *Union*. Why not make a virtue of the Maastricht deception whereby the Member States refused to place Justice and Home Affairs and the (non)Common Foreign and Security Policy within the truly integrated Community and invented two new intergovernmental 'Pillars' and then called this net loss to European integration a 'Union'. To have called the Maastricht Medusa 'Union' had all the integrity of that other Orwellian double-speak 'Union' – the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics – which were neither Socialist nor Republics and the Union of which collapsed as soon as there were no guns to glue them together.

Am I going a bit too far with the comparison? Consider the following paradoxical expression of the Maastricht deception: In the only international forum where Europe acts in a truly integrated fashion and has established itself as a veritable distinct power with its own voice, where it effectively has opposed the Americans and often prevailed – I am talking of the WTO – it uses the name Community. In all other international fora, like the UN, where its internal divisions hang out for all to see (remember the nice spectacle of France & Germany v. the UK & Spain in the Security Council) it uses the name Union. In the days of that other 'Union' – the USSR – at least Belarus and the Ukraine toed the line...

To recommend that the New Europe revert to the Old name of Community is, of course, a battle against the Windmills. But let me don the mantle of Don Quixote and charge those windmills nonetheless. For the case is strong: If Europe's name is to be more than a marketing gimmick but a reflection of an inner truth, in jettisoning 'Community', Europe will have symbolically given up that which was most original in its construct, the perfect symbol of what is special, innovative and at the core of its identity. What, then, is that core?

## 2. Europe – the Second French Revolution

There has been of course plenty of rhetoric at the Convention about the values of Europe. But for the most part, the discussion has been driven by functional considerations of efficiency and a corporatist battle about Institutional power. In considering a name for the new Europe reference has to be made to underlying values, even ideals, of European integration. In the rush to improve the means, ends are often forgotten.

When all is said and done, the modern story of Europe, both in theory and praxis, represents a veritable revolution – one no less important than the French Revolution more than two centuries ago. In making this comparison, I am aware of the nuances and ambiguities in the appreciation of the French Revolution, where the rhetoric of fraternity and equality was often just that, rhetoric. But even its most severe critics accord the French Revolution a decisive influence on Western political life.

From a juridical perspective the French Revolution introduced three major ruptures:

- It redefined the fundamental notions of both sovereign power and legitimacy within the state linking both to the nation as a composite of sovereign citizens for whom and by whom all public power flowed;
- It redefined, in the same vein, the notion of the rule of law to which all public institutions were bound – laying the foundation for the democratic liberal state;
- The French Revolution redefined in a Kantian or neo-Kantian fashion the individual, as the bearer of fundamental rights and as the principal subject, not just an object of the State and the nation.

These three elements encapsulate the link between the two revolutions:

- Europe redefined the notion of Sovereignty and the legitimacy of power albeit in the transnational sphere;
- Europe introduced the notion of the Rule of Law into the sphere of international and transnational relations in a manner which to this date remains utterly unique;
- Finally, Europe in its internal order repositioned the individual as subject, no longer an object as is common in most international treaties. Even in human rights treaties, individuals are the objects in relation to which States negotiate. Within the European Community (but not the Union...) the individual is not such a subject. He or she may sue their governments and assert rights which courts throughout Europe are obligated to respect.

In the same way that the influence of the French Revolution extended well beyond its frontiers, such has also been the experience of the European Revolution. It is the yardstick, the ideal-type that many others aspire to and attempt to emulate. The decline in the legitimacy of 'national interest', of 'raison d'état' and the insistence of holding governments and leaders to account under the rule of law, such as in the Pinochet Saga and the new International Criminal Court (ICC), are all the heritage of the European Revolution.

Decisively, the revolution of Europe was that it aspired to and achieved something that hitherto seemed impossible: A high level of integration, a level elsewhere achieved only within federal states, without, however, becoming such a State. All federal states started with the rhetoric of maintaining the sovereignty and independence and autonomy of their constituent units. The history of federalism is the history of that broken promise, the inexorable transfer of power to the center. Europe should stick to that original conception – redefining relations among states, creating a community of States – not becoming one itself.

So why adopt a name – United Europe or European Union – both of which are so clearly associated with Statehood?

European Union or a United Europe are fairly and squarely in the ballpark of Statehood with the aforementioned unappetizing precedents: The USSR the USA and several others. Why be associated with that nomenclature? Why not choose the historic name which gave perfect and original expression to that original construct – the European *Community*?

### 3. The Ideals of Europe

But there are deeper reasons for choosing the historic name Community. To understand these we must go back in time to the foundational ideals of the Founding Fathers.

Peace, in the immediate wake of World War II was the most explicit and evocative of ideals, for which the would-be-polity was to be an instrument. Nowhere is this captured better than in the oft repeated phraseology of the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950:



'World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of constructive efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it [...]

The gathering of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and the Federal Republic of Germany; The first concern in any action undertaken must be these two countries [...]

[This] solidarity [...] will make it plain that any war between France and the Federal Republic of Germany becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible [...]

Peace, at all times an attractive desideratum, would have had its appeal in purely utilitarian terms. But it is readily apparent that in the historical context in which the Schuman Plan was put forward, the notion of peace as an ideal probes a far deeper stratum than simple Swords into Ploughshares, Sitting under ones' Vines and Fig Trees, Lambs and Wolves - the classic Biblical metaphor for peace. The dilemma posed was an acute example of the alleged tension between Grace and Justice which has taxed philosophers and theologians through the ages -- from William of Ockham (pre-modern), Friedrich Nietzsche (modernist) and the repugnant but profound Martin Heidegger (post-modern).

These were, after all, the early 50s with the horrors of War still fresh in the mind and, in particular, the memory of the unspeakable savagery of German occupation. It would take many years for the hatred in countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark or France to subside fully. The idea, then, in 1950, of a Community of Equals as providing the structural underpinning for long-term peace among yesteryears enemies, represented more than the wise counsel of experienced statesmen.

It was also a call for forgiveness, a challenge to overcome an understandable hatred. In that particular historical context, the Schumanian notion of Peace resonates with, is evocative of, the distinct discourse, imagery and values of Christian Love, of Grace - not, I think, a particularly astonishing evocation given the personal backgrounds of the Founding Fathers - Adenauer, De Gasperi, Schuman, Monnet himself.

*Prosperity* is the second value for which the Community was to be instrumental. Max Kohnstamm used to say: The twin dilemmas for Monnet were 'What do we do with Germany?' - I translated the answer given as the Peace Ideal in the European Construct - and 'How to rebuild Europe' - and I translate that as the ideal of Prosperity. This is captured in, among other places, Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome:

'The Community shall have as its task [...] to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living [...].'

The focus on prosperity should not come as a surprise. After all, the economic reconstruction of the devastated continent was intimately connected with the notion of peace. Each was the means for the other. Indeed in the biblical passage, frequent in the book of Judges, peace and prosperity are linked: The vineyard and the fig tree being a symbol for both.

At first blush it is hard to capture the altruistic, non-hedonistic dimension of the quest for prosperity. Are we not here in the presence of pure self-interest, something to be almost ashamed of - the very antithesis of altruism, challenge, sacrifice which are essential parts of idealistic narrative? The Community's quest for prosperity in its formative years took place in a period which inextricably linked it with widespread (re)construction, with visible (re)generation, with palpable effort and toil. Bread gained with the sweat of one's brow is a matter for pride rather than embarrassment, shame and degradation. Last but not least, linking prosperity to a cooperative enterprise inevitably blunted the sharp edges of avidity feelings. The Community in its reconstructive effort was about collective responsibility: It was a regime which attempted to constrain unchecked search for economic prosperity by one Member State at the expense of others. To be sure, there was an economic theory of open markets, level playing field and all the rest which informed the Common Market. But the elements of transnational economic solidarity, are an undeniable part of the discourse at the time and of the Treaty itself. This solidarity is the element which appeals to the better self. It is the control of the demonic at the statal economic level.

Put in this way - we also detect here, as with the Peace ideal, the deeper roots of the Community notion of Prosperity as an ideal: It links up with and is evocative of, a different but no less central strand of European idealism since the mid 19th century: Be it socialism, fabianism, Welfare Statism all sharing an underlying ethos of collective societal responsibility for the welfare of individuals and the community as a whole. Europe is a community which cares about the least fortunate.

The third ideal, is that of *supranationalism* - for want of a better word. Historically there have always been two competing visions of European

Integration. Whilst no-one has seriously envisioned a Jacobin type centralized Europe, it is clear that one vision - the Unity vision, the United States of Europe vision - has really posited as its ideal type, as its aspiration, a statal Europe, albeit of a federal kind. Tomorrow's Europe in this form would indeed constitute the final demise of Member State nationalism replacing or placing the hitherto warring Member States within a political union of federal governance.

It is easy to see some of the faults of this vision: It would be more than ironic if a polity set up as a means to counter the excesses of statism ended up coming round full circle and transforming itself into a (super) state. It would be equally ironic if the ethos which rejected the abuses of the nation-state, gave birth to a polity with the same potential for abuse. The problem with this Unity vision is that its very realization entails its negation.

The alternative vision, the one that historically has prevailed, is the supranational vision, the community vision. At one level, aspirations here are both modest, compared to the Union model, and reactionary: Supranationalism, the notion of community rather than unity, is about affirming the values of the liberal nation-state by redefining a different relationship among the Member States. Another way of saying this would be that Supranationalism aspires to keep the values of the nation-state pure and uncorrupted. At another level, the supranational community project is far more ambitious than the Unity one and far more radical. It is more ambitious since, unlike the Unity project which simply wishes to redraw the actual political boundaries of the polity within the existing nation-state conceptual framework, albeit federal, the supranational project seeks to redefine the very notion of boundaries of the State, between the Nation and State, and within the nation itself. It is more radical since it involves more complex demands and greater constraints on the actors. At the pure statal level Supranationalism replaces the 'liberal' premise of international society with a community one. Crucially, the community idea is not meant to eliminate the national state but to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new discipline. The idyllic is a state of affairs which eliminates the excesses of narrow statal 'national interest'. The challenge is to control at societal level the uncontrolled reflexes of national interest in the international sphere.

The ideals of Peace, Prosperity, Supranationalism which animated the Community in its foundational period are, on my reading, a new expression to the three principal strands of European idealism which the 20th century inherits. They tap into core values of Christianity, Social Responsibility and the Enlightenment.

What is special about the type of ideals which the European Community encapsulated is in fact their *community* nature - they are the type of ideals which depend for their realization on being shared by a group of persons; definitionally they are beyond the reach of a lone individual. Further, it is not only that they cannot be achieved by any one individual, that they require a community for their practice, in fact they are constitutive of a Community - they create the Community on whose existence they depend.

That this is so in relation to peace is self-evident: It takes, as the saying goes, two to tango. It is only slightly less self-evident in relation to the supranationalism cluster. The invitation to pierce the veil of nationality is at one level to celebrate the individual as an autonomous being, a universe unto himself or herself, an end not a mere instrumentality. But it is also, at the same time, with all the richness of paradox, evocative of the two-sidedness of Enlightenment Liberalism, a cry for community which transcends the artificial barriers of nationality and emphasizes the commonality of shared humanity. It is least evident in relation to the Market, the Community vehicle for prosperity. There is a powerful strand in the political theory of markets which idealizes them as a neutral arena in which by giving freedom to individuals to pursue vigorously individual economic self-betterment aggregate prosperity will be enhanced. The caricature of this view is the 'invisible hand'; its modern hallmarks are passivity of government, unshackling the individual from pervasive regulation and vigorous individual competition. Arguably, it was a variant of this idea which informed and explained government mobilization behind the Single European Act. There is much power to this idea and it is certainly dominant in current discussions. It is also, just as certainly, at odds with the community notion I have been discussing. But there is a complementary view of the market place, with no less an impressive pedigree - Thomas Paine in his *Rights of Man* would be a good place to start - which emphasizes the social dimension of the market. Under this view, when government sets out actively to create or expand a market, against the backdrop of, say, historical agrarian autarchy and feudalism or, closer to us, national protectionism, it is not only economic goals which can be achieved. The market on this view is a forum for personal intercourse, for social interaction, for widening of horizons, for learning about and learning to respect others and their habits. It is community too.

The originality of the European construct finds thus its noblest expression in the most original of names – the Community of Europe - the European Community.

# Union européenne: force et continuité d'un nom

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**Emilio Colombo<sup>1</sup>**

## 1. De l'importance du nom

*Nomina sunt consequentia rerum.*<sup>2</sup> L'empereur Justinien (527-565 ap. J.-C.) avait raison lorsqu'il définissait la façon selon laquelle la substance s'incarne dans le nom, affirmant ainsi sa définition et son droit à être reconnue et respectée. Il est aussi vrai que la question du *nomen* n'est pas secondaire, qu'elle n'est pas seulement une conséquence, qu'elle n'implique pas seulement de donner une forme à la substance, mais qu'elle est elle-même substance, lorsqu'elle en interprète et en anticipe les possibles enjeux.

On pourrait évoquer l'ancienne polémique entre structuralistes et linguistes, mais ce serait un expédient qui n'aiderait pas à comprendre le sens de la question posée: *quel nom donner à la construction européenne?* Je pense à un nom définitif, et si prégnant qu'il pourrait inclure le passé, le présent et le futur d'une entreprise encore en cours, d'un chantier encore ouvert.

Le processus historique de formation de l'unité européenne, accidenté et non dépourvu de difficultés, est encore loin de son achèvement définitif. Comme toute entreprise humaine, celle-ci aussi, extraordinaire, se caractérise par les différents registres dans lesquels elle s'est inscrite au fil du temps.

L'Europe est sans doute l'une des plus grandes constructions à laquelle l'humanité se soit appliquée. Elle a trouvé son énergie dans les répliques

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2 'Les noms sont la conséquence des choses', Justinien, *Les Institutes*, II, 7.

tragiques de l'histoire et mis en marche un processus qui, surtout dès l'après-guerre, a reçu, bien qu'à travers des phases alternatives, des impulsions décisives qui ont conduit le 'vieux continent' (dans son acception classique, et non pas celle de la récente polémique entre la France, l'Allemagne et les Etats-Unis) à atteindre des objectifs extraordinaires et impensables.

## *2. Tendances et évolutions dans le processus d'intégration continentale*

Tout cela n'aurait jamais été possible si, à ce projet, n'avaient pas été associés aspirations, utopies et mouvements visant à promouvoir l'idée d'un consortium de peuples unis par un espace économique et civil commun, et par une trame sur laquelle se sont entrelacées des volontés politiques et des relations institutionnelles cohérentes.

L'europhisme a été un horizon auquel ont contribué des esprits insignes, de grands philosophes et hommes d'Etat. Je crois que l'on peut dire qu'il ne s'est pas agi d'un mouvement de masse, mais de l'action d'élites illuminées qui s'est progressivement imposée au 'sens commun' et a trouvé des échos puissants parmi les classes dirigeantes nationales. C'est ainsi que l'europhisme est apparu comme réponse à la crise des Etats nationaux, notamment dans le contexte bipolaire de l'après-guerre où l'Europe s'est trouvée divisée en deux.

Au fil du temps, différentes tendances ont gravité dans l'orbite de l'europhisme. D'une part, une tendance unificatrice, à travers des accords de collaboration et de coopération entre les Etats nationaux, sans que ceux-ci renoncent pour autant à des portions de souveraineté. De l'autre, une tendance plus fortement ancrée dans la conviction que seul un pouvoir fédéral, indépendant des Etats membres et constitué de façon légitime et démocratique, pourrait créer les conditions nécessaires à l'émergence un espace unitaire et unifié.

Deux visions se sont confrontées: un europhisme internationaliste et un europhisme fédéraliste. Un europhisme internationaliste, c'est-à-dire l'idée d'une confédération d'Etats souverains qui ne constitue pas une nouvelle entité étatique. Un europhisme fédéraliste, à savoir l'idée d'une structure fédéraliste organisée sur la base d'une Constitution répartissant la souveraineté entre plusieurs niveaux de gouvernement (local, régional, national, supranational).

L'histoire, quant à elle, s'est chargée de donner raison à un européisme *tertium genus*, défini comme 'fonctionnaliste', et résultant du compromis chaque fois dégagé entre les deux tendances classiques précédemment évoquées. Cette solution s'est avérée historiquement efficace, puisqu'elle a permis, dans le dernier demi-siècle, de préserver (du moins formellement) l'intégrité de la souveraineté des Etats, tout en définissant un possible dépassement de celle-ci par les Etats sujets des processus d'intégration.

Jean Monnet lui-même a reconnu les mérites de la méthode fonctionnaliste, dont la réalisation dépendait d'une forte dialectique entre les deux 'européismes'. Je rappelle que le processus d'intégration s'est conjugué jusqu'en 1954 avec la signature d'importants accords de coopération internationale dans le domaine économique – l'OECE pour la distribution des aides américaines à l'Europe (Pacte de Bruxelles et naissance de l'UEO) – et aux ententes survenues dans le domaine politique (création du Conseil d'Europe à travers l'implication des parlementaires nationaux).

Les Etats-Unis avaient subordonné la concession des aides à la définition de formes de coopération internationales. Cela ouvrit la voie à la naissance de la Communauté du Charbon et de l'Acier (CECA), une réalisation typiquement fonctionnaliste. L'Italie y adhéra, bien qu'elle n'ait pas d'intérêts directs dans le secteur charbonnier et sidérurgique, grâce à la détermination d'Alcide De Gasperi, et à son intuition prophétique sur la valeur meta-économique de ces formes d'intégration dans le développement de futurs processus d'unification.

Un projet plus ambitieux encore fut ensuite entamé par la Communauté européenne de défense (CED), antichambre d'une définition plus organique des pouvoirs supra-étatiques, à laquelle avait été confié le soin de penser une armée européenne et des structures de défense communes. On sait comment la non-ratification par l'Assemblée nationale en France empêcha qu'une étape fondamentale soit franchie dans la voie d'un dessein organique fédéraliste.

C'est avec les Traités de Rome de 1957 que naquirent la CEE et l'Euratom. A la suite du déclin de l'emphase fédéraliste, ceux-ci marquèrent le retour au réalisme fonctionnaliste qui a représenté le véritable fil conducteur de la construction européenne jusqu'à présent. Dans tous les cas, la naissance de la CEE permit l'élimination progressive des obstacles à la libre circulation des marchandises, des personnes et des capitaux; l'union douanière fut créée, ainsi que le grand Marché commun dans lequel il a été possible de développer

les échanges et de voir s'éveiller une saison durable de progrès du continent européen.

La philosophie fédéraliste ne se réveillera qu'en 1979, avec la première élection au suffrage universel direct du Parlement européen: un parlement avec des pouvoirs réels très limités, mais auquel on donnait néanmoins la confiance nécessaire à l'approbation d'un projet de traité pour l'institution de l'Union européenne.

Le projet se heurta à de fortes oppositions au Royaume Uni, en Grèce et au Danemark, tout en comptant sur le soutien de l'Italie, de la France et de l'Allemagne. Le repli sur des initiatives moins ambitieuses et des objectifs dilués dans le temps était dès lors inévitable.

Qu'il me soit permis, à ce propos, d'évoquer certains souvenirs personnels relatifs aux débuts du processus évolutif des institutions communautaires qui a abouti au Traité de Maastricht. L'initiative italo-allemande pour la relance de l'Union européenne, née en 1981 d'une proposition de mon collègue Genscher et de moi-même, proposait des solutions concrètes afin de dépasser la paralysie dans laquelle se trouvaient les institutions communautaires, prisonnières des limites de compétence prévues par le Traité de Rome. Le soi-disant 'Acte Genscher-Colombo' aboutit à la Déclaration Solennelle de Stuttgart sur l'Union européenne du 19 juin 1983, dont la portée apparut initialement peut-être plus limitée que celle que nous avions souhaitée. Mais les résultats finaux du processus entamé à ce moment-là nous ont donné raison par la suite. L'élaboration de la Déclaration solennelle de Stuttgart servit, en effet, à sensibiliser l'opinion publique à la nécessité de la 'relance' européenne, et à poser la question inéluctable de l'évolution de la Communauté. Elle servit de plate-forme pour l'Acte unique de 1986. En affirmant pour la première fois le principe selon lequel 'en s'exprimant d'une seule voix en politique étrangère, y compris sur des aspects politiques de la sécurité, l'Europe peut contribuer au maintien de la paix',<sup>3</sup> la Déclaration de Stuttgart, posa non seulement les bases pour le renforcement de la coopération politique, mais lia cette dernière à la 'coordination des positions des Etats membres sur les aspects politiques et économiques de la sécurité, afin de promouvoir et faciliter le développement progressif de telles positions [...] dans un nombre croissant de domaines de

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3 'Déclaration Solennelle sur l'Union européenne', signée à Stuttgart le 19 juin 1983 par les Chefs d'Etats et de gouvernements des Etats membres des Communautés européennes, où ils étaient réunis pour le 26ème Conseil Européen, sous la présidence de M. Helmut Kohl, reproduite dans: *Agence Europe*, No. 1263, 22 juin 1983, Préambule.



politique étrangère'.<sup>4</sup> La nécessité d'élargir le champ de la politique extérieure commune aux politiques de sécurité s'affirma donc pour la première fois. Ces propos semblaient à l'époque velléitaires à certains, mais aujourd'hui, à la lumière de Maastricht et de Nice, nous pouvons légitimement soutenir qu'ils ne l'étaient pas.

C'est seulement avec l'Acte Unique, élaboré entre 1985 et 1986, qu'il fut possible de renforcer la coopération en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité, de compléter le marché intérieur en uniformisant les législations nationales, d'étendre le champ de décision que le Conseil des Ministres pouvait adopter à la majorité qualifiée (en mettant fin de façon définitive au droit de veto originaire dont les Etats membres disposaient), et de renforcer enfin les pouvoirs du Parlement européen. Cette poussée réformatrice contenue dans l'Acte Unique se concrétisa enfin dans l'approbation des Traités de Maastricht (1992) et d'Amsterdam (1997), qui définiront les profils de la Communauté économique et de la politique extérieure et de sécurité commune, et conduiront à l'adoption de la monnaie unique et à l'institution de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE).

Si le fonctionnalisme a triomphé en matière monétaire, la coopération intergouvernementale a opéré dans le champ de la politique extérieure, de défense et de sécurité sans renoncer à des parts importantes de souveraineté. Un processus, comme on peut le voir, obéissant à des logiques alternatives, mais néanmoins guidé par une dynamique irrévocable vers l'unification et l'intégration.

La contribution italienne à ce long chemin a été non seulement significative, mais tout à fait déterminante, en se caractérisant par sa continuité, sa cohérence, et la richesse de ses propositions. L'Europe a été interprétée différemment qu'elle avait pu l'être jusque là, à savoir comme une réalité unitaire et pluraliste, conçue de façon à jouer un rôle positif et actif dans le système des relations internationales, sans être dans une position subalterne mais sans pulsions hégémoniques non plus.

Le dépassement de la bipolarité du système mondial suite à la chute de l'empire soviétique a rendu plus actuelle encore l'idée d'une Europe engagée dans un partenariat global avec les Etats-Unis, et investie d'une fonction de partage de la mission de maintien de la paix et de promotion d'un nouvel ordre civil bâti sur des relations plus justes entre le Nord et le Sud de la planète.

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4 *Ibid.*, point 1.4.2.

C'est à l'occasion d'une des phases de l'élargissement des frontières de la construction européenne que le Président Giscard d'Estaing a posé le dilemme de *l'ubi consistam* de l'Europe: Europe-espace ou Europe-puissance? Un dilemme, qui, comme toute instance 'rhétorique', trouvait une réponse dans l'ajustement de deux alternatives, c'est-à-dire dans la synthèse d'une Europe qui puisse être à la fois espace et sujet, forme et substance.

### 3. L'Europe aujourd'hui

Toutes les questions auxquelles nous sommes confrontés aujourd'hui sont le résultat d'un long parcours qu'on ne saurait raconter que grossièrement, en retraçant le témoignage de gestes, d'expériences et de choix desquels nous fûmes parfois protagonistes.

L'Europe fait face aujourd'hui à deux problématiques d'envergure extraordinaire: les nouveaux profils de l'économie, au lendemain de l'entrée en vigueur de l'Euro, et la définition de sa Constitution.

L'achèvement de la monnaie unique représente une grande réalisation, qui n'est pas seulement économique. Il me semble que personne ne sous-estime aujourd'hui les effets que l'Euro a produit et est en train de produire sur la coutume et sur la philosophie domestique des européens. Au-delà de la 'force communicative' qu'une monnaie exerce dans le grand système des relations humaines, puisqu'elle unifie les paramètres, les gestes, les calculs faits au quotidien, les petits et moyens projets faits par les familles comme les comptes et les programmes des Etats, il est inévitable qu'une monnaie unique rappelle l'urgence d'un Gouvernement européen de l'économie et d'un pouvoir supranational qui en représente le présupposé institutionnel. Il n'est pas non plus concevable qu'une monnaie sans Etat et sans politique économique de référence puisse survivre longtemps.

Le débat sur les réformes structurelles devrait recevoir précisément de la monnaie unique l'impulsion nécessaire pour arriver à des aboutissements concrets. Je me réfère au thème, déjà traité à Barcelone, du dépassement des barrières qui existent aujourd'hui encore sur certains marchés - comme ceux de l'intermédiation financière, des transports et de l'énergie. S'il y a un 'modèle' européen auquel il faudrait faire référence, c'est bien celui qui trouve ses repères historiques, culturels et de valeurs dans l'expérience de l'économie sociale

de marché', synthèse de la rencontre entre la raison du développement économique et celle de la solidarité. Je pense aux accomplissements du catholicisme social et libéral, mais aussi aux intuitions de la meilleure pensée laïque. Ceux qui par contre considèrent que la 'fin de l'histoire' marque la victoire d'une pensée unique établissant la primauté du marché sans règles, pur instrument de mesure des pulsions de l'économie et des égoïsmes humains, ceux-ci finiront par accepter comme fatales et irrévocables les injustices et les myopies les plus sordides, et la faiblesse et l'isolement qui naîtraient de la nature inégale du progrès économique et social. Tout ceci a été considéré comme le fondement des travaux préparatoires de la Constitution européenne, et doit être évalué en tant que contribution fondamentale au processus d'unification.

'Refonder' l'Europe était et demeure un objectif particulièrement ambitieux, qui devra tenir compte des urgences de la géopolitique. L'élargissement à l'Est de l'Europe pose déjà des problèmes complexes d'harmonisation et de nouvelle définition des contours, des mécanismes et des institutions qui doivent caractériser le fonctionnement d'un continent en marche vers l'unification. Il s'agit – et c'est un travail en cours – de doter un grand espace economico-civil d'une personnalité institutionnelle forte et de repères partagés de politique générale: de l'économie à la politique extérieure, à la politique sociale, à la sécurité. Sur le plan de l'accomplissement institutionnel, il faudra doter l'Union de ce qui lui manque encore et qui représente le fruit de l'expérience démocratique de l'Occident: la décision à la majorité, le lien de l'Exécutif et du Législatif à une pleine légitimité populaire, l'équilibre des pouvoirs.

Le continent européen, des Balkans à la Méditerranée, devra se placer dans une perspective de stabilité, non seulement vis-à-vis de sa zone orientale, mais aussi vis-à-vis des pays de la Méditerranée, en termes de coopération renforcée et de partenariat authentique. Il faudra passer de plus en plus d'une logique horizontale de confrontation Est-Ouest à une perspective de coopération Nord-Sud comme manière-clé pour l'Europe de faire face aux grands défis de la globalisation.

Il a été judicieusement souligné que 'le but de la Constitution européenne sera d'établir les règles permettant la réalisation de tous ces biens publics que les peuples souhaitent et que seule l'Union est en mesure de produire'. Naturellement, l'accord sur les règles est profondément différent de l'accord sur les valeurs'. Par conséquent, la recherche de règles communes qui ne sont certes pas neutres mais représentent le reflet d'un patrimoine commun et partagé de

ressources morales et civiles, ne doit pas aboutir à la dispersion du ferment qui a toujours accompagné, bien que de manière cyclique, le débat sur l'Europe. Car le grand thème qui nous passionne et nous implique aujourd'hui, alors que la Constitution européenne est en phase de naître, c'est de savoir comment l'Europe peut vivre et s'affirmer en tant qu'idéal et valeur sociale, en conquérant les sociétés civiles, en devenant leur drapeau et leur horizon, en triomphant des nationalismes et des provincialismes, entrant ainsi dans le *sens commun*. Une Europe comme famille des nations, ouverte aux autres continents, une 'véritable "maison commune"' - comme l'a déclaré le Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini en évoquant ses racines chrétiennes - 'réalité capable d'offrir leur place à des formes d'ouvertures intelligentes et mûres, accueil et hospitalité',<sup>5</sup> continent ouvert et solidaire, artisan et exportateur de paix.

#### 4. Le nom de la future Europe

La réflexion sur l'opportunité d'un changement de nom de l'Union naît de la conviction que la période que celle-ci est en train de traverser, avec son cinquième élargissement et la Convention sur son avenir, est plus qu'une simple étape dans le processus d'intégration du Continent, mais un véritable tournant historique.

Quel est alors le nom à donner à cette construction qui a impliqué toutes les générations de l'après-guerre dans un pari a priori impossible? Un nom qui sanctionne la chute des vieilles définitions, y compris celle de 'communauté', liée à la pratique fonctionnaliste et aux choix faits il y a plus d'un lustre par une technocratie illuminée.

Les objections à la conception d'une Europe tout à la fois Union et Communauté - défendues entre autres à Maastricht et à Amsterdam - ont été désormais dépassées. Elles s'appuyaient sur la crainte que des matières 'sensibles', considérées de compétence nationale ou intergouvernementale, puissent être traitées avec la méthode communautaire. Aujourd'hui, avec l'approbation de la Constitution européenne comme source primaire du droit commun, on définit dans *Union européenne* non seulement le sujet unitaire qui exerce les différentes compétences, bien qu'à travers des procédures différentes selon les domaines respectifs, mais aussi le *nom* (*nomen omen*) qui les résume à leur juste valeur.

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5 Interview avec le Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, réalisée par Pierangelo Giovanetti, disponible sur le site Internet de la 'Società aperta. Movimento politico e culturale Trento', à l'adresse [www.societaperta.it/articoli/illustri/martini.htm](http://www.societaperta.it/articoli/illustri/martini.htm)

Le mot 'union' dérive du latin *unus* ('un'). En Europe, 'Union' signifie unité dans le chemin. 'Union' photographie et reflète l'avancement d'une syntonie; c'est un concept ontologique et historiciste à la fois, capable de conjuguer les identités qui participent au processus unitaire et le consolident, en y déposant leurs valeurs, leurs sentiments, leurs attentes, mais aussi leurs investissements dans le futur.

'Union' comme association, forme éthique, politique et institutionnelle de coopération, qui, après Lisbonne, devra intervenir sur l'économie et les politiques sociales aussi bien que sur celles qui règlent la gestion des biens relationnels et immatériels, sans réduire la première à la mesure aride des paramètres et les secondes à la simple réglementation conjoncturelle. Mais plutôt, en investissant sur la stabilité, sur le développement et sur la justice sociale comme étalon de mesure du meilleur modèle possible d'équité civile. Comme l'a relevé le Vice-président de la Convention Giuliano Amato, une *Union européenne* qui approuve les lois-cadre, adopte les décisions, formules les recommandations et les opinions, mais dans l'articulation des différentes fonctions constitutionnelles, en tant que protagoniste unique, partagé, reconnu et reconnaissable de l'histoire des années à venir.



# Réflexions sur ‘Europe Unie’ et les autres noms de la future Europe<sup>1</sup>

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**Bronislaw Geremek<sup>2</sup>**

*Collegium:* Croyez-vous que l’on devrait changer le nom de l’Europe, que l’Europe a besoin aujourd’hui d’être rebaptisée, et pourquoi?

*Geremek:* Je ne suis pas certain que l’Europe doive changer de nom maintenant. Je crois seulement que l’Europe cherche une nouvelle formule d’existence politique. Il s’agit plutôt de changer le cadre juridique et chercher à donner un sens nouveau au processus d’intégration. Je ne suis pas certain que le changement de nom pourrait ajouter à cela quelque chose.

*Collegium:* De quel ‘sens nouveau’ parlez-vous?

*Geremek:* Je vous répondrai de façon personnelle, c’est à dire pas du tout comme si je devais faire un exposé savant. L’Europe est pour moi un rêve et une tradition culturelle. Un rêve parce que pendant longtemps mon pays est resté en dehors du processus d’intégration européenne, tout en gardant le sens profond d’appartenance à l’Europe. Plus de quarante ans d’appartenance à un camp politique et à un régime qui n’était pas dans la tradition européenne ne nous a pas privé du sentiment d’appartenance à l’Europe. Ceci correspond à ce que l’Europe avait en termes de potentiel émotionnel. L’Europe, c’était la liberté. L’Europe, c’était l’Occident, c’était une sorte de compensation. Et tout cela dans un contexte où nous étions de l’autre côté de la ligne frontière avec l’Europe, mais côté de l’ennemi de l’Europe. Si la Pologne n’a pas participé à l’intégration européenne, cela n’a jamais été de son propre gré. Elle n’a pas pu profiter du Plan Marshall parce que Staline avait interdit aux pays de l’Est d’y

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1 Cette interview a été réalisée à Bruges, Belgique, le 22 Novembre 2002.

2 Bronislaw Geremek est Ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en Pologne, et Titulaire de la Chaire de Civilisation européenne au Collège d’Europe, Natolin.

participer. Toute participation est demeurée impossible par la suite. C'est par hasard qu'un polonais était présent au Congrès de La Haye, auquel le Collège d'Europe doit en outre son existence. Et c'est par hasard qu'il y avait des polonais dans toutes les institutions européennes, y compris le Collège d'Europe dont le Recteur a été pendant plusieurs années un historien polonais.

Par la suite, durant les années '80 avec le mouvement de *Solidarność* (Solidarité), je me rappelle des contacts que nous avons eu, moi même et mon ami (le Premier Ministre Polonais après mois dès juin 1989), Tadeusz Mazowiecki notamment, avec le Parlement européen et la Communauté européenne. Il s'agissait de comprendre comment combler le fossé entre les Pays de l'Est, comme la Pologne, qui cherchaient à se libérer, et les Communautés européennes. Sur ce plan, on peut dire que le processus de rapprochement de l'Europe en construction a commencé, du moins pour ce qui concerne la Pologne, il y a de plus de vingt ans.

J'avais un rapport très particulier avec le nom 'Communauté européenne'. Pour moi, 'Communauté' était un nom chaleureux. Ce nom n'avait rien à avoir avec l'image de la bureaucratie bruxelloise, il était éloigné des questions formelles et techniques. Le terme 'Communauté' me semblait correspondre parfaitement à l'essence même du processus d'intégration. J'ai très vite compris que le Traité de Maastricht cherchait à donner au processus d'intégration européenne un cadre nouveau, que le changement de nom de 'Communauté européenne' pour 'Union européenne' correspondait à l'adoption d'une nouvelle philosophie de l'intégration européenne. Au moment de la campagne pour le référendum en France sur le traité de Maastricht, j'ai perçu la possibilité d'une nouvelle perspective pour l'Europe. Néanmoins, j'ai gardé jusqu'à maintenant un certain sentiment en faveur de l'expression 'Communauté européenne', un attachement certain au nom de ce produit de l'intégration européenne. Aujourd'hui, il me semble qu'il ne s'agit pas du tout d'une histoire passée, et qu'il nous faut nous rappeler toujours que ce que nous sommes en train de faire et de dire est une véritable communauté, bien qu'elle soit une communauté avec un 'c' minuscule et non majuscule.

**Collegium:** Est-ce que l'adoption du nom 'Europe Unie' au lieu de 'Union européenne' permettrait de mettre l'accent sur les cultures (représentées par 'Europe') plutôt que sur la force du continent (réfléchi par le mot 'Union')? Encore, est-ce que vous croyez que l'adoption du nom 'Europe unie' refléterait bien l'importance historique de l'élargissement?



**Geremek:** Je ne doute pas de ce que l'élargissement qui est en train de se décider et de se faire, n'est pas similaire aux précédents. Pour la première fois, on peut parler d'unification de l'Europe et, d'après moi, elle devrait trouver son expression dans la 'passion des pensées'. Cette passion européenne devrait également s'exprimer dans les grands projets concernant la Constitution européenne. C'est en fait l'unification de l'Europe qui est en train de se faire. Vu sous cet angle, le changement de nom devrait me plaire parce qu'il montrerait bien aux peuples, aux citoyens d'Europe, combien cet élargissement représente une immense chance. Il ne s'agit pas de créer de nouvelles difficultés ou de complexifier l'Union européenne, mais au contraire d'une incroyable opportunité pour tous. Nous apportons la merveilleuse chance de la réunification européenne. Avec cet élargissement se termine un XXème siècle marqué par les guerres nées des divisions nationales, et s'achève aussi la Guerre Froide qui a divisé l'Europe. Par conséquent, je devrais soutenir le nom 'Europe Unie'. Toutefois, je crois qu'il ne faut pas chercher à exprimer d'aussi importantes réalités par le changement de nom. Ce n'est pas forcément nécessaire. Si nous disons 'United Europe' ou 'Europe Unie' sur quoi mettons-nous l'accent? Est-ce sur 'Europe'? Ou bien sur 'Unie'? Je n'en suis pas sûr. Si nous disons 'Union européenne', nous employons peut-être un terme qui n'est pas très heureux, car il définit un ensemble, une union, et seulement ensuite l'adjectif montre que cet ensemble trouve son origine sur le continent européen. En effet, dans le terme 'Europe unie', l'accent est mis à juste titre sur le mot 'Europe'.

La formule 'Etats-Unis d'Europe' aurait les mêmes avantages, mettant également l'accent sur le terme 'Europe', mais il ne serait pas pertinent de rappeler le concept d'État-nation dans le nom de la future Europe. A mon avis, la solution la plus simple serait de dire 'Europe' tout court. Toutefois, si l'on considère qu'une partie importante du continent ne participe pas à l'intégration européenne et demeure en dehors du cadre actuel de l'Union Européenne, l'expression 'Europe' aurait un déficit de légitimité.

Mon idée est pourtant une idée d'opportunité. Le terme 'Union Européenne' existe, il s'est enraciné sur le terrain, dans le langage politique et dans la conscience populaire. Cela ne vaut peut-être pas la peine de changer de nom. Mieux vaudrait-il changer les choses.

**Collegium:** Quel est et quel devrait être le message du nom associé au processus d'intégration européenne?

**Geremek:** Je crois que le message le plus important du nom est: 'le processus d'unification européenne est en train de se faire'. De ce point de vue, la chose la plus significative s'est passée en fait au début des années '90, alors que la Communauté Européenne, bénéficiant de l'énorme succès non seulement du Marché Commun mais aussi des institutions gérant le Marché Commun ainsi qu'un certain sentiment d'intérêt commun, a décidé d'ouvrir un chapitre très important, peut être le plus important de l'histoire du processus d'intégration, à savoir le chapitre sur l'intégration politique. En effet, l'adoption du nom 'Union Européenne' visait précisément à rendre l'idée d'un changement significatif, d'une simple Communauté économique à une plus ambitieuse communauté politique. Aujourd'hui, la communauté économique avec la communauté politique appelée 'Union Européenne' reçoit, grâce à l'élargissement, le cadre qui lui est naturel, parce qu'il n'y a plus de partage dramatique entre l'Ouest capitaliste et l'Est communiste. Ce partage symbolisé par le mur de Berlin a maintenant complètement disparu, avec l'élargissement, et non pas seulement avec la chute du mur. Donc, si je me prononce pour la préservation du nom actuel, c'est parce que je le projet politique qui est en train de se réaliser trouve une nouvelle chance et une nouvelle dimension grâce à l'unification européenne.

**Collegium:** Est-ce que vous pensez que le changement du nom en 'Europe unie' pourrait amener les autres pays et les autres régions du monde à voir à l'horizon du continent unifié une sorte de 'Grande Europe' – ou d' 'Europe forteresse' - qui se dessine?

**Geremek:** Je ne pense pas que le nom puisse changer la réalité des choses. L' 'Europe forteresse' est un concept politique, et son éventuelle réalisation dépend de la volonté des peuples, des gouvernements nationaux et de l'Union Européenne. La question du rapport entre l'Union Européenne et l'Europe pose problème, parce que la Communauté Européenne n'est pas l'Europe, et l'Union européenne n'est pas l'Europe non plus. Alors, lorsque l'on dit 'Europe Unie', et dans cette 'Europe Unie' il n'y a pas de Macédoniens, il n'y a pas d'Ukrainiens, serait-il justifié de dire que l'Europe soit finalement 'unie'? Je n'en suis pas certain. Je crois plutôt que ce nom donnerait un caractère exclusif à l'intégration européenne, et que son adoption créerait un message d'exclusivité et d'exclusion plutôt que d'inclusion vis-à-vis de l'Europe qui reste en dehors du processus. Je suis sensible, et je n'aime pas l'exclusion.

Je crois que l'Europe, dans son histoire, a déjà eu suffisamment de moments d'exclusions, de politiques et de pratiques d'exclusion. Hérodote parlait d'Europe

quand il voulait exclure les Scythes, et ensuite ces Scythes ont été acceptés. Ensuite, lorsque au VIII<sup>ème</sup> siècle le mot 'européen' apparaît pour la première fois, là aussi il y a un potentiel négatif à cause de la conquête arabe qui menaçait l'Europe. Je crois qu'aujourd'hui il faudrait éviter cet aspect exclusif. Je pense que l'Europe devrait être un concept ouvert, et l'intégration européenne inclusive par définition. Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? Simplement, qu'il ne faut pas tuer les espérances des autres. Si certains pays veulent devenir membres de l'Union européenne et se réclament d'appartenir à notre civilisation, il appartient à eux dès lors d'en juger et non pas aux savants qui prétendent dire 'vous êtes européens', et qui cherchent à être les juges de toute une civilisation.

L'Europe repose aujourd'hui sur des critères plus importants que les critères géographiques, sur des critères qui sont des critères culturels et juridiques. Je pense d'une part à l'ensemble des conventions du Conseil de l'Europe, et d'autre part aux critères de Copenhague. Les critères de Copenhague établissent d'une façon claire et solide qu'à l'avenir, pour ne pas briser ce qui a été acquis au cours l'intégration européenne, il faut sauvegarder la démocratie et l'Etat de droit, le respect des droits de l'Homme, le respect des droits des minorités, et, en même temps, maintenir une sorte de santé et liberté économique, tout comme la stabilité interne. Ces critères sont compris comme les conditions *sine qua non* pour prendre partie au processus d'intégration européenne.

Ma conclusion c'est qu'il faut préserver cette ouverture, et malgré tout ce qui est resté ouvert dans le processus d'intégration européenne.

**Collegium:** Comme vous le dites, l'Europe c'est beaucoup plus un projet d'intégration fondé sur l'Etat de droit, sur les droit de l'Homme, sur des valeurs humaines. Mais il ne s'agit pas de valeurs exclusivement européennes. L'Europe n'a-t-elle finalement aucun sens géographique et aucune dimension culturelle? Quelles seraient alors les frontières de l'Europe? Y a-t-il une limite quelque part? Ou toute limite est-elle simplement dans les esprits?

**Geremek:** Je crois que nous avons besoin d'un débat public en Europe sur l'horizon géographique du continent européen. Toutes les limites de Europe sont claires sauf celles de l'Est. Ceci était le cas déjà au XVIII<sup>ème</sup> siècle. A l'époque, l'empereur russe introduisait certains nouveaux principes administratifs. Il souhaitait les appliquer différemment aux territoires de l'Ouest et aux territoires caucasiens. Il demanda pourtant à ses conseillers de lui montrer la frontière entre la Russie européenne et la Russie asiatique. Un géographe de la

cour de l'empereur, Vasili Tatishchev, définit enfin cette ligne (en 1728), qui à son avis était représentée par l'Oural. A partir de cela, les deux régions sur les deux cotés de l'Oural recevaient deux organisations administratives différentes. Est-ce que cela peut être définitif? Et en général, est-ce qu'on peut dire que des critères solides ont établis les frontières de l'Est de l'Europe? Je n'en suis pas sûr.

Ce qui me paraît important, c'est d'introduire cette question dans le débat public, d'y introduire le 'problème de la frontière entre les deux Russies'. Je crois, en effet, qu'il s'agit d'abord d'un problème culturel, inscrit dans les esprits. Mais il faut également considérer toutes les questions posées par l'histoire récente. Je pense, par exemple, à la question du rôle de la religion dans la formation de la civilisation européenne. D'aucuns disent que l'Europe a besoin de cohésion. Cette cohésion peut être donnée seulement par l'application d'un critère religieux unique. L'Europe s'est en effet formée dans la religion de la civilisation judéo-chrétienne. Mais à cela on peut ajouter qu'au cours de l'intégration européenne il y a eu une longue période pendant laquelle les églises orthodoxes et le christianisme orthodoxe n'étaient pas acceptés, et qu'en fait l'adhésion de la Grèce brisait une certaine tradition religieuse de l'intégration européenne. Maintenant un problème similaire se pose pour le Kosovo, la Macédoine, l'Albanie, pays à forte présence islamique, très forte dans le cas du Kosovo, et moins forte dans le cas de la Macédoine ou de l'Albanie.

En tout cas, il ne faut pas oublier que maintenant dans les pays occidentaux de l'Union européenne il y a près de 20 millions d'immigrants. Il ne faut pas penser qu'il s'agit d'un fait nouveau, uniquement lié aux mouvements migratoires récents. Il faut considérer que c'est la continuation de ce qui était l'immense avantage dont bénéficie l'Europe. C'est aussi le reflet de la diversité et de l'ouverture qui caractérise l'Europe, et je ne pense pas pourtant qu'on puisse définir les limites de cette Europe par la religion. On a posé le problème – et M. Giscard d'Estaing l'a posé d'une façon très courageuse – de savoir si la Turquie appartenait à l'Europe ou à l'Asie. Je ne crois pas que les critères à appliquer pour obtenir une réponse doivent être religieux. Ces critères doivent être plutôt culturels et politiques. Finalement, il est certes important de définir l'horizon de l'élargissement, mais il faut bien considérer que chaque génération européenne établit son propre horizon. Et nous ne savons pas quelle sera la réponse à cette question dans cinquante ans. Nous ne pouvons pas hypothéquer le futur. Pour cela, il me semble justifié de dire qu'après l'élargissement actuel, l'Union Européenne a besoin d'une politique européenne de l'Est à l'égard des pays qui restent en dehors de son processus d'inclusion, au delà de sa frontière,

et que l'Europe ne peut pas oublier. Il faut une politique à l'égard de l'Ukraine, de la Biélorussie et de la Russie. Deuxièmement, l'Union européenne a besoin d'une politique des Balkans parce que maintenant les pays comme la Croatie, la Serbie, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Macédoine, l'Albanie, restent en dehors de l'horizon de l'élargissement (la Roumanie et la Bulgarie se trouvent déjà dans le calendrier) et alors je crois que c'est aux citoyens et aux élites politiques de l'Union européenne de poser la question et d'en chercher la réponse. L'horizon actuel est tel que je ne vois pas ce que l'Europe sera d'ici vingt ans. L'Ukraine à l'intérieur de l'Union européenne? L'Albanie même en son sein? Nous ne savons pas. Pour l'instant, je crois que la Russie, grand pays, qui se trouve entre l'Europe et l'Asie, qui a une identité eurasiatique, qui a une ambition sur l'océan Pacifique, ne se trouve pas dans l'horizon de l'élargissement européen. Un pays comme la Biélorussie, où il y a une dictature et l'Etat de droit, la démocratie et les droits de l'Homme ne sont pas respectés, n'est pas dans l'horizon de l'élargissement. Il y aura aussi un moment où nous, les Européens, nous aurons à nous interroger sur notre attitude vis-à-vis des pays du Maghreb. Est-ce la Méditerranée, qui était en fait un lieu de rencontre et d'unité, un lieu où l'esprit européen s'est formé, appartient à notre espace commun? La question ne se pose pas pour ma génération, ni pour celle des jeunes d'aujourd'hui, mais elle pourrait se poser un jour. Les réponses à la question 'où se termine l'Europe?' ont changé d'une époque à l'autre, c'est le moins que l'on puisse dire. Celle-ci est une réflexion que les Européens devraient garder à l'esprit.

**Collegium:** Qui devrait choisir le nom de l'Europe? Les gouvernements, les parlements nationaux, les intellectuels, les citoyens?

**Geremek:** Dans le système européen nous avons à faire à l'enracinement des principes de démocratie représentative. L'institution parlementaire est pourtant la mieux qualifiée pour prendre une telle décision. En même temps, j'ai beaucoup aimé l'idée lancée M. Giscard d'Estaing, selon laquelle cette question du nom de l'Union Européenne devrait être testée auprès des jeunes européens. Les jeunes devraient décider le nom de la future Europe. D'abord pour la simple raison que la communauté que nous sommes en train de créer et renforcer, c'est la communauté dans laquelle vivront les jeunes générations d'aujourd'hui. Deuxièmement, les jeunes sont moins sensibles aux expériences du passé concernant l'intégration européenne, et aussi aux noms associés aux diverses formes du processus d'intégration. Il faudrait demander aux jeunes et décider ensuite, en posant la question au Parlement européen. Il est très important de donner aux jeunes européens la possibilité de consolider un rapport

émotionnel à l'égard de l'intégration européenne. L'intégration européenne s'est faite sans poésie. On ne peut pas construire l'esprit de la Communauté sans poser le problème de son âme et des valeurs qui la nourrissent. Il faut créer un rapport affectif, et le débat sur le nom peut certainement y contribuer, mais il est davantage plus important de débattre de la substance des choses.

Le processus de l'élargissement à l'unification pourrait bien être associé au terme 'Communauté', parce que 'Communauté' c'est une âme, c'est une Communauté vive, une Communauté des citoyens, une Communauté d'êtres humains, et non pas une Communauté d'Etats-nations. En même temps, ce processus pourrait tout aussi bien être lié au terme 'Union'. En effet, Union signifie dépassement de l'égoïsme national, de ce qui a été à l'origine des deux guerres mondiales, des déchirements de l'Europe au cours des XIXème et XXème siècles. Je souhaiterais qu'il y ait un débat sur les fondements de chaque appellation proposée pour la future Europe. Toutefois, je ne vous cacherais pas que mon sentiment penche plutôt pour la conservation du terme 'Union européenne'.

Les questions ont été posées par les étudiants du Groupe de Travail sur le Nom de la Future Europe.

# A propos d'‘Europe Unie’<sup>1</sup>

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**Vaclav Havel<sup>2</sup>**

*Collegium:* Que vous inspire la proposition de rebaptiser l'Union Européenne en 'Europe Unie'?

*Havel:* La suggestion renvoie à l'idée que ce qui est en jeu est l'unification du continent et pas seulement l'‘élargissement’ d'un modèle de l'Ouest à l'Est. Cette dernière idée est plutôt liée au processus de ce que l'on appelle la 'globalisation'. Personnellement, comme je l'ai déjà dit dans mon discours de mars 1999 sur la nécessité d'une Constitution européenne, je suis convaincu que la direction souhaitable est le renforcement du processus d'intégration européenne dans un sens fédéraliste: l'Europe comme un sujet de droit international doté d'une constitution propre me paraît mieux répondre aux enjeux à venir de la mondialisation. Certains confondent de façon absurde les deux, l'Europe et la mondialisation, et voient dans l'intégration européenne une menace pour leur identité nationale. Or, si quelque chose menace les identités nationales, c'est bien la globalisation appelée de leurs vœux par ces mêmes nations quand il s'agit d'attirer chez elle les 'compagnies globales' qui leur vendent des produits de consommation 'universels' dans les supermarchés, dans les 'supercinémas', etc... C'est effectivement une tendance à l'uniformisation où, de Singapour à Prague, vous ne savez plus vraiment où vous êtes, puisque tout se ressemble. Voilà une certaine forme d'unification du monde qui peut susciter des inquiétudes et qu'il faut distinguer de la coopération entre Etats démocratiques sur un principe fédéraliste. Face à cela, celui dont l'identité

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- 1 Nous sommes particulièrement grés à M. Jacques Rupnik, Directeur de Recherche au Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) de Sciences Po, Paris, et Professeur au Collège d'Europe de Bruges, d'avoir accepté de poser à M. Vaclav Havel cette question sur le nom 'Europe Unie'.
  - 2 Vaclav Havel est écrivain et Ancien Président de la République Tchèque.

nationale est incertaine a tendance à invoquer la 'nation' et la 'patrie'. Celui qui dépasse l'inquiétude identitaire est prêt à s'ouvrir à l'unification de l'Europe. L'Europe unie non pas comme menace globalisatrice, mais comme réponse aux défis de la globalisation.

L'autre dimension de l'"unification de l'Europe", c'est de savoir jusqu'où doit-elle s'étendre. La frontière orientale de l'Europe est incertaine et c'est pour cela qu'une clarification s'impose, car une frontière floue ne présage rien de bon pour la viabilité d'une entité politique. Avant de poser la question de la Turquie ou de la Russie, on doit poser celle de l'Ukraine et de la Biélorussie, voire de la Géorgie et de l'Arménie. Je me garderai ici d'affirmer qui a vocation ou non à devenir, un jour, membre de l'Union, mais il faudra que celle-ci dise enfin où elle commence et où elle s'arrête. Elle ne pourra s'élargir indéfiniment. J'ai dit autrefois, à propos d'une autre organisation internationale: 'Il y a des institutions qui périssent d'un excès de politesse'.

Cette question a été posée en Novembre 2002.



# L'idée des États-Unis d'Europe dans la construction de l'Europe

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**Gilbert Trausch<sup>1</sup>**

## 1. Victor Hugo visionnaire

En 1849 Victor Hugo, à la fois homme politique - il est député à l'Assemblée nationale - et écrivain, lance dans le débat public une formule qui va devenir célèbre: les Etats-Unis d'Europe. Il ne l'a pas inventée, comme en verra plus bas, mais il en a assuré la fortune. L'expression qu'il utilise dans un discours devant le congrès de la Paix à Paris (22 août 1849), surprend par sa nouveauté et choque par son audace. Référence est faite à un pays européen hors d'Europe, à une puissance moyenne que les grandes puissances européennes prennent encore peu en compte. Voici le texte de l'intervention hugolienne:

Un jour viendra où l'on verra ces deux groupes immenses, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, les Etats-Unis d'Europe (applaudissements) placés en face l'un de l'autre, se tendant la main pardessus les mers, échangeant leurs produits, leur commerce, leur industrie, leurs arts, leurs génies, défrichant le globe, colonisant les déserts, améliorant la création sous le regard du Créateur...<sup>2</sup>

Par la suite Victor Hugo fera encore de nombreuses allusions aux Etats-Unis d'Europe dans ses discours et ses écrits. Il lui arrive de s'adresser à ses auditeurs et à ses lecteurs comme à des 'citoyens des Etats-Unis d'Europe' ou encore 'mes

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2 On trouve la meilleure collection des textes européens chez Frank Wilhelm, *Victor Hugo et l'idée des Etats-Unis d'Europe* (Luxembourg: Ed. Association des amis de la Maison de Victor Hugo, 2000), p. 47. Voir encore Pascal Ory, *L'Europe. Textes réunis et présentés* (Paris: Omnibus, 1998) et surtout André et Danielle Cabanis, *L'Europe de Victor Hugo* (Privat à Toulouse, 2002). Très utile, Denis De Rougement, *28 siècles d'Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les textes d'Hésiode à nos jours* (Paris: Bartillat, 1990).

compatriotes européens'. Le contenu de la formule est enveloppé dans un flou artistique et le ton est incantatoire avec des formulations à l'emporte-pièce: 'L'avenir est inévitable, et, en buvant aux Etats-Unis d'Europe, je bois à ce magnifique avenir' (1869), ou: 'Nous aurons ces grands Etats-Unis d'Europe, qui couronneront le vieux monde comme les Etats-Unis d'Amérique couronnent le nouveau' (1876).

Pour Victor Hugo ces Etats Unis d'Europe seront un havre pour les libertés modernes, un modèle de l'état de droit. Effectivement de nos jours le vieux et le nouveau monde défendent des valeurs communes sur lesquelles de temps à autre des divergences peuvent survenir comme p. ex. sur la peine de mort que Victor Hugo rejette.

Dans sa conception de l'Europe Victor Hugo, peut-être inspiré par Montesquieu, met en évidence une hiérarchie des valeurs: d'abord la nation à laquelle l'homme est naturellement attaché, puis l'Europe unie, finalement l'humanité. Son ouverture sur l'Europe n'empêche pas Victor Hugo d'assigner à la France une place tout-à-fait à part dans la formation de cette Europe: 'cette nation aura pour capitale Paris et ne s'appellera pas la France; elle s'appellera l'Europe'.

On retiendra de la vision hugolienne de l'Europe deux intuitions qui en font un de ses prophètes. L'Europe ne peut se faire qu'autour de la France et de l'Allemagne: 'La France et l'Allemagne sont essentiellement l'Europe. L'Allemagne est le cœur; la France est la tête'. La Grande-Bretagne et la Russie n'y auront pas leur place: 'L'alliance de la France et de l'Allemagne, c'est la constitution de l'Europe. L'Allemagne adossée à la France arrête la Russie, la France amicalement adossée à l'Allemagne arrête l'Angleterre' (1876).

L'autre intuition est ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui le droit d'ingérence, une des grandes innovations du XXème siècle finissant. Victor Hugo dénonce les atrocités commises par les Turcs contre les Serbes: 'c'est que tout cela est horrible, c'est qu'il suffisait d'un geste des gouvernements d'Europe pour l'empêcher, et que les sauvages qui commettent ces forfaits sont effrayants, et que les civilisés qui les laissent commettre sont épouvantables'. Et puis cette belle formule que le Conseil européen pourrait méditer: 'Ce qui se passe en Serbie démontre la nécessité des Etats-Unis d'Europe' (1876).

Victor Hugo prophète, sans doute; utopiste certainement. Mais utopiste lucide: 'les utopies d'un siècle sont les faits du siècle suivant' (1842).

On s'est étendu ici sur les conceptions de Victor Hugo même s'il n'a pas inventé lui-même la formule 'les Etats-Unis d'Europe'. Elle a été utilisée par un avocat français du nom de Vesinet lors d'un discours prononcé le 25 décembre 1847; elle apparaît dans le *Moniteur universel* du 28 février 1848 et c'est probablement de là que Victor Hugo la tient. L'écrivain italien Carlo Cattaneo l'utilise dans un livre paru en 1848.<sup>3</sup> Un journaliste anglais, Charles Mackay, revendique de son côté la paternité de l'expression.<sup>4</sup>

On serait tenté de dire que Victor Hugo saisit l'expression au vol et par la magie de son verbe, la force de ses convictions et sa gloire d'écrivain la consacra jusqu'à nos jours. Dès les origines elle a divisé les esprits. Les participants au Congrès de la Paix applaudissent à tout rompre. A l'Assemblée nationale les députés de gauche manifestent leur adhésion, ceux de droite leur incompréhension. Le procès-verbal de la séance du 17 juillet 1851 note: 'Mouvement. Long éclat de rire à droite' ou encore 'A gauche: très bien! très bien! Nouveaux rire à droite'. Montalembert s'écrit: 'Les Etats-Unis d'Europe! C'est trop fort. Hugo est fou'.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. Le temps de la Realpolitik

La formule ne disparaîtra plus du débat sur l'Europe, tantôt en demi-teinte comme lors de la formation des alliances militaires et de la course aux armements (1890-1914), tantôt avec intensité comme au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale. Elle passe d'abord par une phase romantique dont le tenant le plus représentatif est Giuseppe Mazzini, à la fois rêveur et homme d'action voire agitateur. Il applique ses conceptions romantiques et optimistes à la fois à la nation et à l'Europe. Pour lui l'émancipation des nations doit déboucher sur celles d'une Europe unie dans laquelle les nations vivent en harmonie les unes avec les autres. Mazzini a eu de l'influence sur Napoléon III, lui aussi un romantique à sa façon, qui en 1867 se déclare favorable à la réalisation des Etats-Unis d'Europe alors qu'on en chercherait en vain les traces dans sa politique, sinon son penchant pour le libre-échange.

Mazzini disparaît (1872) au moment où avec Bismarck (créateur du Reich allemand en 1871) la *Realpolitik* triomphe. La formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe

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3 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire* (Paris: Denoel, 1965), pp. 217-218.

4 Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke. Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1964), pp. 243-244.

5 Frank Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

6 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

fait rêver Napoléon III mais rire Bismarck. Il ne croit pas à une Europe unie: 'J'ai toujours trouvé le mot Europe dans la bouche des hommes d'Etat qui veulent obtenir d'une puissance étrangère quelque chose qu'ils ne risqueraient pas de demander en leur propre nom'.<sup>7</sup> Pour lui, comme d'ailleurs pour les hommes politiques anglais, l'Europe est une simple notion géographique, dépourvue de toute signification politique.

Dans sa polémique avec le théologien et publiciste D.-F. Strauß à propos de l'annexion de l'Alsace au nouveau Reich (1871) Ernest Renan esquisse dans une vue prophétique la solution d'avenir: 'La paix ne peut, à ce qu'il semble, être conclue directement entre la France et l'Allemagne: elle ne peut être l'ouvrage que de l'Europe [...]'. Pour lui cette solution ne peut venir que d'une 'sorte de congrès des Etats-Unis d'Europe'. C'est la voie que J. Monnet et R. Schuman choisiront en 1950 pour construire l'Europe. En 1882, Renan revient sur la question dans une autre publication: 'Les nations ne sont pas quelque chose d'éternel. Elles ont commencé, elles finiront. La confédération européenne, probablement les remplacera'.<sup>8</sup> On notera les fluctuations: tantôt Etats-Unis d'Europe, tantôt confédération européenne. Le contenu de ces formules reste drapé dans le vague. Je doute que Jean Monnet ait connu ces écrits, car il était obsédé par le présent et tourné vers l'avenir. Ni Victor Hugo ni Ernest Renan ni aucun autre 'prédécesseur', à l'exception d'Aristide Briand, ne sont mentionnés dans ses *Mémoires* parus en 1976.

L'équilibre des six grandes puissances européennes (Grande-Bretagne, France, Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, Russie et Italie) cède la place à un équilibre précaire entre deux blocs antagonistes, la Triple et la Triple Entente avec comme conséquence la course aux armements qui débouche sur la Première Guerre mondiale qui est avant tout une grande guerre européenne. Appeler dans ce contexte les Européens à créer les Etats-Unis d'Europe paraissait relever de l'imaginaire, voire du fantasmatique.

### 3. *Idées généreuses et tâtonnements*

En 1919, le Traité de Versailles réorganise l'Europe, en grande partie sous

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7 Claude Delmas, *Histoire des projets d'unification politique de l'Europe 1815-1970* (Heule-Bruxelles-Namur: UGA, 1971), p. 73.

8 Ernest Renan, 'Qu'est ce qu'une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882', in: Henriette Psichari, *Œuvres complètes de Ernest Renan* (Paris: Callman-Lévy, 1947), t. I, p. 905.

l'impulsion du président W. Wilson qui ne raisonne pas en termes d'Europe mais du monde. La Société des Nations qu'il impose est en toute logique une organisation mondiale dans laquelle, il est vrai, les Etats européens formaient une large majorité. Contenue par le dogme de la souveraineté nationale et le manque de moyens coercitifs la Société des Nations est condamnée à l'impuissance.<sup>9</sup>

En dehors mais aussi à l'intérieur de la Société des Nations il y aura dans les années 1920 de nombreuses tendances à unir les Etats européens, le plus souvent sur le plan économique (union douanière). Le Français L. Loucheur, plusieurs fois ministre entre 1916 et 1931, parle de faire les Etats-Unis d'Europe sur le plan économique. Le maître de forge luxembourgeois E. Mayrisch essaye de rapprocher les Allemands et les Français par un cartel sidérurgique et une meilleure connaissance les uns des autres.<sup>10</sup>

Deux initiatives émergent. Le publiciste austro-hongrois R. Coudenhove-Kalergi publie en 1923 un livre qui aura un grand retentissement, *Paneuropa*. Pour le titre il s'est inspiré d'un ouvrage qui venait de paraître, *Panamerika*. Si entre Paneurope et Etats-Unis d'Europe il y a une distinction sémantique, elle ne recouvre pas de différence sur le fond. Les deux expressions restent suffisamment vagues pour permettre de multiples approches.<sup>11</sup>

Coudenhove-Kalergi crée encore un mouvement et une revue portant le même nom. Il prévoit la conclusion d'un pacte paneuropéen qui toutefois n'entamerait pas la souveraineté des Etats membres. L'entreprise de Coudenhove est significative parce qu'elle touche, au-delà de l'Allemagne et de l'Autriche, les milieux économiques et politiques français. La preuve, le 25 février 1925 E. Herriot, président du Conseil, affirme à la Chambre: 'Mon plus grand désir est de voir un jour apparaître les Etats-Unis d'Europe'.<sup>12</sup> Depuis Napoléon III c'est pour la première fois qu'un homme politique en exercice emploie la formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe.

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9 Pour le contexte général voir Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 1985).

10 Eric Bussière, 'Le foisonnement de l'entre-deux-guerres', in: Eric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin et Gilbert Trausch (édit.), *L'idée et l'identité européennes de l'Antiquité grecque au XXIème siècle*, (Bruxelles: Mercator Fonds, 2001). Voir encore Gilbert Trausch, *Le Maître de forges Emile Mayrisch et son épouse Aline. Puissance et influence au service d'une vision* (Luxembourg: Banque de Luxembourg, 1999).

11 Lucien de Sainte Lorette, *L'idée d'Union fédérale européenne* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955); Bernard Voyenne, *Histoire de l'idée européenne* (Paris: Payot, 1964).

12 Jena-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'idée d'Europe*, op. cit., p. 274; Lucien de Sainte Lorette, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

Le 5 septembre 1929 A. Briand, alors Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires étrangères, reprend la formule dans un discours prononcé à Genève à la Société des Nations et qu'il a élaboré en dehors des bureaux du Quai d'Orsay.<sup>13</sup> C'est la qualité de l'orateur et la signification de l'endroit qui expliquent le grand retentissement du discours. Voilà qu'un homme d'Etat de premier plan, dirigeant d'un grand pays, propose devant un aréopage d'hommes politiques européens les Etats-Unis d'Europe. A voir son discours de près on se rend compte que Briand dont la souplesse d'esprit était proverbiale, reste très prudent dans la formulation: 'je pense qu'entre les peuples qui sont géographiquement groupés comme les peuples d'Europe, il doit exister une sorte de lien fédéral'.<sup>14</sup> Briand sait que parler des Etats-Unis d'Europe évoque forcément une organisation fédérale. L'emploi du mot 'sorte de...' atténue la formule.

Si le discours frappe les opinions publiques, il laisse les dirigeants européens sceptiques! Ils demandent à Briand de préciser ses vues dans un mémorandum. Ce dernier révèle ce qu'il entendait par 'une sorte de lien fédéral': 'en aucun cas et à aucun degré, l'institution du lien fédéral recherché entre Gouvernements européens ne saurait affecter en rien aucun des droits souverains des Etats membres d'une telle association de fait'. Et pour qu'aucun doute ne subsiste il continue et renchérit: 'C'est sur le plan de la souveraineté absolue et de l'entière indépendance politique que doit être réalisée l'entente entre nations européennes'.<sup>15</sup> Des Etats-Unis d'Europe ne subsiste qu'une confédération d'Etats, une 'association de fait', sous-groupe de la Société des Nations.

En faisant son discours de 1929 Briand savait que les Etats européens n'étaient pas mûrs pour un véritable projet fédéral, mais l'effet d'annonce a été pleinement atteint. Les réponses faites par vingt-six Gouvernements sont loin d'être encourageantes. Le dossier est enterré dans les tiroirs d'une commission d'études qui siègera pendant des années sans le moindre résultat. Le krach du 24 octobre 1929 qui entraîne un retour au protectionnisme ainsi que la montée des nationalismes et des régimes fascistes ne laissent plus aucune chance à un projet européen. Certes, des intellectuels et des militants enthousiastes tel Coudenhove-Kalergi continuent à se battre pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe, 'mais ce courant intellectuel n'est qu'un filet d'eau impuissant'.<sup>16</sup>

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13 Antoine Fleury (édit.), *Le Plan Briand d'Union fédérale européenne* (Bern: Peter, 1998), notamment Bariety, 'Aristide Briand: les raisons d'un oubli', pp. 1-13.

14 Lucien de Sainte Lorette, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

15 Texte du mémorandum in Antoine Fleury, *op. cit.*, pp. 569-582, citation p. 573.

16 Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

## 4. La relance de l'après-guerre

Au lendemain du cataclysme de 1939-1945 les Européens prennent conscience qu'il est dû en dernière analyse à la non-Europe. Donc il faut faire l'Europe, de toute urgence. Durant la guerre déjà des projets avaient été élaborés – surtout dans les milieux de la résistance<sup>17</sup> – dans lesquels les Etats-Unis d'Europe font leur réapparition, avec une vigueur nouvelle. En 1941, un groupe d'intellectuels italiens emprisonnés sur l'îlot rocheux de Ventotene rédige sous l'impulsion d'A. Spinelli, E. Rossi et E. Colorni un manifeste qui est un plaidoyer vibrant et lucide pour l'unité de l'Europe. Il se termine par la phrase: 'Le chemin devant nous n'est ni facile ni sûr mais nous devons le suivre et nous le ferons'. Quelques mois après la rédaction du manifeste de Ventotene Altiero Spinelli élabore un premier programme pour l'après-guerre: 'Les Etats-Unis d'Europe et les diverses tendances politiques'.<sup>18</sup> Il est resté fidèle toute sa vie durant à sa conception fédéraliste. Il a été à l'origine d'un projet de traité visant la fondation d'une Union européenne (1984)<sup>19</sup> que les gouvernements, plus attachés à une conception intergouvernementale, se sont bien gardés d'entériner tel quel.

Jean Monnet, de son côté, réfléchit à la future organisation de l'Europe, d'abord à Alger dans le cadre du Comité Français de libération nationale, puis à Paris dans celui du Commissariat général du Plan de modernisation et d'équipement. Ses conceptions tournent autour de projets économiques dans lesquels l'industrie sidérurgique, l'avenir de l'Allemagne et les relations avec les Etats-Unis occupent une place de choix.<sup>20</sup> Monnet ne recourt pas au cours de ces années de la guerre et de l'immédiat après-guerre à la formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe. On a pu dire de lui que 'l'unité de l'Europe ne répond pas chez lui à un idéal, mais à une nécessité'.<sup>21</sup>

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17 Michel Dumoulin (dir.), *Plans des temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre 1940-1947* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1995).

18 Altiero Spinelli, 'Gli Stati Uniti d'Europa e le varie tendenze politiche', in: Eugenio Colorni, *Problemi della federazione europea*, (Rome: Edizioni del Movimento Italiano per la Federazione Europea, 1944). En traduction anglaise voir Walter Lipgens (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration. Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945* (Berlin and New York, 1985), pp. 471-489.

19 Walter Lipgens (ed.), *45 Jahre Ringen um die europäische Verfassung. Dokumente 1939-1984. Von der Widerstandsbewegung bis zum Vertragsentwurf des Europäischen Parlamentes* (Bonn: Europa-Union-Verlag, 1986), pp. 657-658 et pp. 711-736.

20 Gérard Bossuat, 'Jean Monnet et l'avenir de l'Europe 1940-1948', in: Michel Dumoulin, *Plans des temps de guerre*, op.cit., pp. 325-365.

21 *Ibid*, p. 365.

Le foisonnement des projets européens ainsi que des mouvements européens font des années 1945-1948 un véritable laboratoire des diverses conceptions européennes.<sup>22</sup> La charge émotionnelle de la formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe est telle qu'elle est fréquemment employée, habituellement dans un flou qui masque les divergences d'interprétation. Citons, à titre d'exemple le 'Mouvement socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe'. Le discours de Churchill à Zurich (19 septembre 1946) a un retentissement extraordinaire tant par le prestige et l'éloquence de l'orateur que par les idées avancées. Par-là il fait penser aux discours de Victor Hugo. Dans un appel vibrant il exhorte l'Europe continentale – dans laquelle la Grande-Bretagne n'a pas vocation à entrer et dont la Russie serait exclue – à s'unir. Il importe d'urgence 'to form the United States of Europe or whatever name or form it may take'. Il termine de façon grandiloquente: 'Therefore I say to you: Let Europe arise!'. Dans son discours il reste très vague sur la nature de cette Europe à construire mais appelle à la création d'un Conseil de l'Europe. Pour lui 'the structure of the United States of Europe [must be] well and truly built', ce qui est une formulation ouverte à toutes les interprétations. Peu de doute cependant sur le fond: les Etats-Unis tels que Churchill les voit ressemblent beaucoup à la Paneurope de Coudenhove-Kalergi ou aux Etats-Unis d'Europe de Briand.<sup>23</sup>

Au Congrès de La Haye (mai 1948) l'enthousiasme européen s'en donne à cœur joie et les allusions au discours de Victor Hugo sont nombreuses. Toutefois les réalisations ne sont pas à la hauteur de l'attente. Ni l'Organisation européenne de Coopération économique (OECE, 1948) ni le Conseil de l'Europe (1949) ne dépassent le stade intergouvernemental. Le strict respect de la souveraineté des Etats membres rappelle la conception d'A. Briand en 1929 - 1930. Rien dans leurs structures ne permettrait de faire référence aux Etats-Unis d'Europe.

Quelques sondages (juillet – septembre 1947) permettent de voir un peu plus clair sans lever toutefois toutes les ambiguïtés.<sup>24</sup> A la question de savoir ce qu'ils entendent par les Etats-Unis d'Europe: 21% des Français pensent à une confédération d'Etats ou à une alliance politique pour maintenir la paix; 21% à

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22 Deux classiques de la construction européenne: Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1983) et Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1996).

23 Voir à ce sujet Campagna, 'Churchill and the United States of Europe, 25 octobre 1946', in: Walter Lippens and Wilfried Loth (eds.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, t. 3.: *The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries* (Berlin, 1988) pp. 160-163. Le discours de Zurich, *ibid.*, pp. 662-666.

24 Walter Lippens and Wilfried Loth (eds.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, t. 4, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 587-588.



une union douanière ou économique et 19% à une fédération politique ou à une organisation similaire aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique (39% des réponses sont du genre: je ne sais pas très bien). Les Etats-Unis d'Europe sont vraiment une notion très élastique. C'est un genre fourre-tout qui révèle toute la palette des convictions proeuropéennes.

Voici les réponses à la question: Est-ce que les Etats-Unis d'Europe sont une bonne idée?

	France	Pays-Bas	Norvège	Suède	USA
Bonne idée	61%	55%	49%	35%	68%
Mauvaise idée	10%	5%	10%	11%	24%
Pas d'opinion	29%	34%	35%	34%	8%

## 5. Une percée décisive

Ce sont Jean Monnet et Robert Schuman qui, par leur appel du 9 mai 1950, font faire à l'Europe un pas capital vers ce qu'on pourrait s'imaginer sous le terme d'Etats-Unis d'Europe.

Pour la première fois le principe sacro-saint de la souveraineté nationale est battu en brèche au profit d'une Haute Autorité dotée de prérogatives supranationales et dont Jean Monnet sera le premier président.

Certes, l'appel du 9 mai a de propos délibéré évité le terme de supranationalité pour ne pas effaroucher ceux qu'aujourd'hui on appelle les souverainistes, mais la notion s'y trouve en filigrane ('une Haute Autorité dont les décisions lieront la France, l'Allemagne et les pays qui y adhéreront').<sup>25</sup> On connaît la suite. Dans le sillage de la CECA et sous la contrainte du réarmement allemand un traité créant une Communauté Européenne de Défense est négocié et signé par les six pays membres. Une Commission *ad hoc* est chargée d'élaborer une constitution européenne. La voie vers une union politique semble ouverte avec au bout les Etats-Unis d'Europe.

Jean Monnet qui jusque-là s'était, à notre connaissance, abstenu de parler en public des Etats-Unis d'Europe commence à utiliser la formule. Il sait bien que la

25 Il y a eu en tout 9 versions de l'appel du 9 mai 1950. La 5ème parle de 'l'institution d'une autorité supranationale'. Henri Rieben et al., *Un changement d'espérance. La déclaration du 9 mai 1950. Jean Monnet-Robert Schuman* (Lausanne, 2000), p. 132.

CED commence à faire peur, qu'une résistance croissante se fait jour, notamment dans son pays. Voici comment il termine une allocution prononcée pour le troisième anniversaire de l'appel du 9 mai 1950: 'Et si nous sommes dans l'orage, nous ne doutons pas qu'en continuant dans notre voie, nous en sortirons et aboutirons enfin à ces Etats-Unis d'Europe dont le 9 mai aura marqué la naissance'.<sup>26</sup> Le 11 novembre 1953 il déclare devant une commission américaine:

'la forme de cette révolution [le transfert, effectué en toute liberté, de pouvoirs souverains par des nations qui n'ont subsisté jusqu'ici que sur la base de leur nationalité] démocratique et pacifique que l'Europe subit actuellement aboutira, nous en sommes persuadés, à la création des Etats-Unis d'Europe'.<sup>27</sup>

Patatras! Voilà qu'au dernier moment l'Assemblée nationale française rejette la CED (30 août 1954). Du coup la CECA elle-même est fragilisée. Sentant son œuvre menacée, Jean Monnet démissionne pour reprendre son bâton de pèlerin. Il va de nouveau agir sur le plan sur lequel il excelle: fournir des idées, convaincre, c'est-à-dire faire du lobbying, donner des impulsions et, selon un mot du Général de Gaulle, être un inspirateur.<sup>28</sup> On laisse de côté ici tout le processus de la relance de Messine (1955) qui aboutit aux Traités de Rome (1957).

Jean Monnet y a pris une part active même si au début il est en retrait sur le mémorandum du Benelux (printemps 1955) visant à créer un marché commun. Pour agir il a besoin d'un instrument. Il se le crée à sa mesure et l'appelle 'Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe'.<sup>29</sup> Il réunit en son sein des hommes d'influence, essentiellement des hommes politiques momentanément éloignés du pouvoir ainsi que des syndicalistes, à l'exclusion des représentants des mouvements européens et des centrales patronales.

Dans un mémorandum (20 février 1955) il fixe le but: 'Le moment est venu d'unir dans une même organisation et sur un même programme les partis et les

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26 Jean Monnet, *Robert Schuman. Correspondance 1947-1953* (Lausanne: Archives de la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, 1986), p. 164.

27 Jean Monnet, *Les Etats-Unis ont commencé. La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier. Discours et allocutions 1952-1953* (Paris, 1955), p. 45. Le discours cité à la note précédente ne figure pas dans ce recueil.

28 François Duchêne, Jean Monnet. *The first Statesman of Interdependence*, (New York and London: WW Norton and Cy, 1994) p. 254; Pascal Fontaine, *Jean Monnet. L'inspirateur* (Paris: Jacques Grancher, 1988).

29 Pascal Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet* (Lausanne: 1974).

mouvements décidés à poursuivre ensemble la construction concrète des Etats-Unis d'Europe' et le programme est esquissé en trois points: 'faire les Etats-Unis d'Europe; agir dans le domaine des transports et de l'énergie atomique'.<sup>30</sup> Cette énumération sèche en trois points est révélatrice de la conception de Monnet en ce début de l'année 1955: il pense faire avancer l'Europe et donc les Etats-Unis d'Europe par la voie sectorielle ou, comme l'on disait à l'époque, par des pools, méthode qui avait fait ses preuves avec le charbon et l'acier. Désormais ce seront les transports et surtout l'atome, énergie et technologie modernes, dont il s'était entiché. Aucun de ces secteurs ne donnera le résultat escompté. L'Europe d'aujourd'hui souffre toujours du manque de coordination des transports et la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (Euratom), pourtant sanctionnée par les Traités de Rome (1957), échouera.<sup>31</sup> Ce n'est qu'un peu plus tard que Monnet se ralliera au projet bien plus ambitieux du Benelux visant une union économique.

Jean Monnet est pleinement conscient que la formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe implique stricto sensu une organisation fédérale. A-t-il vraiment cru que les Etats européens pouvaient s'unir à la manière des USA? Il semble que non, selon une confidence qu'il aurait faite à l'ambassadeur A. Berard.<sup>32</sup> Plus que sur une constitution fédérale européenne à la manière d'un Spinelli, Monnet compte de façon croissante sur des 'réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait' (déclaration du 9 mai 1950) pour atteindre le but: 'les réalités elles-mêmes permettront de dégager l'union politique qui est l'objectif de notre Communauté, c'est-à-dire d'établir les Etats-Unis d'Europe' (déclaration du Comité d'Action, 16-17 octobre 1958).<sup>33</sup> Monnet sait que les Etats ne sont pas (encore) mûrs pour y prétendre. Il utilise donc l'expression dans un sens large, parce que c'est une appellation commode, à la portée de tous, pour désigner la volonté des Européens de s'unir plus étroitement. Il continuera à l'utiliser fréquemment. En 1965, dans la préface qu'il donnera au livre de J.-B. Duroselle, *L'idée de l'Europe dans l'histoire*, il l'emploie trois fois sur une même page. Pour lui les institutions européennes, même 'limitées aux affaires économiques représentent bien, cependant, le commencement des Etats-Unis d'Europe'.<sup>34</sup>

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30 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

31 Les raisons, de cet échec: la baisse des prix pétroliers, la volonté de certains Etats de coopérer directement avec les grandes firmes américaines plus avancées, la querelle des filières (uranium naturel contre uranium enrichi), l'accentuation du caractère intergouvernemental. Voir Pierre Gerbet, *op.cit.*, chapitre 'Les difficultés de la CECA et l'échec d'Euratom'.

32 Armand Berard, *Un ambassadeur se souvient* (Paris: Plon, 1978), p. 320.

33 Cité d'après Pierre Gerbet, 'Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle. Deux conceptions de la construction européenne', in: Gérard Bossuat et Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet, L'Europe et les chemins de la paix* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), p. 429.

34 Jean Monnet, dans la préface au livre de Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'idée d'Europe*, *op. cit.* p. 13.

## 6. Une formule face à l'Etat-nation

Non sans raison Monnet a vu dans l'Etat-nation le principal obstacle sur la voie européenne.<sup>35</sup> La faiblesse de sa culture historique<sup>36</sup> fait qu'il a du mal à en reconnaître la légitimité. Au début des années 1950 il a cru le voir vaciller, prêt à s'effondrer. L'échec de la CED (1954) et le retour au pouvoir du général de Gaulle (1958) sont un dur rappel aux réalités de l'histoire.

Il n'est pas inintéressant de comparer ses conceptions avec celles de Robert Schuman qui le 9 mai 1950 s'était fait le garant de son projet et par là le défenseur de la supranationalité. Face à l'Etat-nation Schuman a une approche différente de celle de Monnet. Ses profondes connaissances de l'histoire de l'Europe et son expérience d'homme politique lui ont donné une appréciation plus juste des Etats-nations. Il connaît leur force, à commencer par celle du plus ancien de tous, la France. Il est donc très rapidement amené à mettre en garde contre une extension excessive de la supranationalité.<sup>37</sup> A l'encontre de Monnet, il n'utilise pas la formule des Etats-Unis dans son livre *Pour l'Europe*.<sup>38</sup>

Les années 1960 et 1970 sont des années de stagnation européenne. L'Etat-nation, tant de fois déclaré moribond voire mort, à certes reculé, il a plié mais pas rompu. Il a même repris, familièrement parlant, du poil de la bête. On a même pu affirmer que l'abandon de compétences sur des plans où il est en perte de vitesse lui a donné une nouvelle vigueur, un second souffle.<sup>39</sup> J. Delors, devenu président de la Commission européenne (1985), a fini par en tirer les conséquences en déclarant qu'il faut faire l'Europe avec les Etats et non contre les Etats. En même temps l'Acte unique européen (1986) et l'achèvement du grand marché commun grâce au 'paquet Delors' entraînent une relance de la construction européenne dont l'introduction d'une monnaie commune est le couronnement. Sur le plan politique les progrès restent cependant

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35 Gilbert Trausch, 'L'Europe communautaire, les Etats et les nations à l'aurore du XXIème siècle', in: Michel Dumoulin, Eric Bussière et Gilbert Trausch (édit.), *Europa. L'idée et l'identité européennes de l'Antiquité grecque jusqu'au XXIe siècle* (Bruxelles-Anvers: Fonds Mercator, 2000), pp. 367-380.

36 'sa culture historique était faible', Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet 1888-1979*, (Paris: Fayard, 1996) p. 449.

37 'Il ne faut pas exagérer le caractère supranational, c'est-à-dire cette intégration, il faut la réserver pour les cas extrêmes, pour enrayer la puissance [allusion à l'Allemagne]' (3 novembre 1956). Cité par Gilbert Trausch, *Robert Schuman 1886-1963, Les racines et l'œuvre d'un grand Européen* (Luxembourg, 1986), p. 97.

38 Robert Schuman, *Pour l'Europe* (Paris: Nagel, 1963).

39 Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation state* (London: Routledge, 1992).

décevants.<sup>40</sup> Le pendule de l'attente européenne oscille entre l'euroscptisme et l'euroenthousiasme.

Dans ce climat les questions sémantiques reprennent de l'importance. Le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères J. Fischer prend, à titre personnel, en 2000 position pour une organisation fédérale de l'Europe.<sup>41</sup> Un an plus tard le chancelier G. Schröder reprend la thèse fédérale au point que le journal français *Le Monde* a pu titrer: 'C'est la première fois qu'un chef de gouvernement propose les Etats-Unis d'Europe'<sup>42</sup>. Face aux réserves exprimées à la fois par le Président J. Chirac et le Premier ministre L. Jospin, le chancelier fait rapidement marche arrière.

Dans ce débat la formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe n'a pas la cote. Bien au contraire, c'est une autre formule lancée par J. Delors qui occupe le devant de la scène: la 'fédération des Etats-Nations'. Venant d'un homme toujours proche d'une conception fédérale, la formule peut choquer et cet effet a sans doute été voulu. Delors s'est laissé guider par le sens des réalités: 'je ne crois pas, contrairement à ce qu'affirme le Conseil européen, que cette Europe à 27, demain à 30 ou 32 puisse avoir des objectifs aussi ambitieux que ceux fixés par le traité de Maastricht'.<sup>43</sup> Fort de ses convictions européennes, Delors plaide pour une 'avant-garde' des Etats qui veulent aller loin dans la voie de l'intégration. Ne croyant pas 'que les Etats soient condamnés à disparaître' il a inventé une formule qui allie pour l'avant-garde la fédération aux Etats-Nations. C'est un exercice de haute voltige que Delors maîtrise bien, mais aussi générateur d'ambiguïtés quand p. ex. L. Jospin dont les convictions européennes sont moins évidentes, plaide pour un projet européen 'qui concilie la logique fédérale à la réalité des Etats-Nations'.<sup>44</sup> Là on n'est plus très loin de la rhétorique d'Aristide Briand.

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40 La désunion des pays membres de l'Union européenne sur l'Irak illustre les limites de l'Europe politique.

41 Sur le discours de Fischer et quelques réactions voir Christian Joerges, Yves Mény, Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.), *What kind of Constitution for what kind of Polity ? Responses to Joschka Fischer*, New York: New York University, 2000. Sur les convictions européennes de Fischer voir l'interview dans *Die Zeit*, 15 mars 2001, 'Die Antwort auf fast alle Fragen ist Europa'. Sur les différences franco-allemandes voir H. de Bresson et Daniel Vernet, 'L'Europe, la France et le projet fédéral allemand', dans *Le Monde*, 4 mai 2001. Voir aussi lettre de H. Védrine à J. Fischer, "'Klassischer Föderalismus" oder Föderation von Nationalstaaten?', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 juin 2000. Norbert Blome, 'Fischers Vision auf dem Prüfstand', dans: *Die Welt*, 18 mai 2000.

42 *Le Monde*, 3 mai 2001.

43 'Jacques Delors critique la stratégie d'élargissement de l'Union', interview parue dans *Le Monde*, 19 janvier 2000; 'Vorschläge für eine europäische Avantgarde. Jacques Delors plädiert für einen Vertrag im Vertrag', in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 Mai 2000.

44 Laurent Zecchini, 'Lionel Jospin veut un projet européen qui concilie "la logique fédérale à la réalité d'Etats-nations"', dans: *Le Monde*, 22 mars 2001; Daniel Vernet, 'Europe: les oublis de Lionel Jospin', dans: *Le Monde*, 2 juin 2001.

Les mots ne sont pas neutres. Une force à l'intensité variable les habite. Le mémorandum de Briand adressé pour examen aux gouvernements européens en 1930 parle d'Union européenne, de Communauté européenne et des Etats-Unis d'Europe, noms qui aux yeux de son auteur,<sup>45</sup> revêtent une même signification. De ces trois appellations c'est pourtant la dernière qui l'emporte par la force qu'elle véhicule.

Plus que toute autre formule européenne, celle des Etats-Unis d'Europe frappe l'imagination des peuples européens et cela pour plusieurs raisons. Elle a pour elle une ancienneté incontestable qui, en quelque sorte, lui confère lettres de noblesse. Depuis un siècle et demi elle n'a jamais disparu des débats sur l'avenir de l'Europe. Elle est cependant restée longtemps circonscrite aux cercles des intellectuels (écrivains et publicistes) et n'a gagné les milieux politiques qu'après la Première Guerre mondiale.

Mieux que toute autre formule elle dit bien ce qu'elle veut dire, l'inéluctable nécessité des Etats européens de rechercher une union sans doute destinée à devenir de plus en plus étroite. Elle permet cependant deux approches. La première est celle qui vise la formation d'un Etat fédéral, selon le modèle américain, même si une copie conforme n'est pas envisagée. Dans la bouche d'un homme comme J. Fischer le recours à la formule des Etats-Unis est évidemment un plaidoyer pour une Europe fédérale. La seconde vise un rapprochement qui resterait plus ou moins en-deça du modèle fédéral. C'est sans doute ainsi qu'il faut comprendre l'approche d'un A. Briand.

Le succès de la formule doit beaucoup au terme de référence, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Le prestige de ces derniers aux yeux des Européens, superpuissance à la fois économique et politique, n'a fait que croître tout au long du XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle. L'Europe sent qu'elle pourrait être leur pareil, à condition que les Etats qui la composent soient capables de s'unir de façon efficace. La notion d'Europe puissance, tant discutée aujourd'hui, ne prend son sens que par rapport aux USA.

Il ne faut pourtant pas oublier que la formule des Etats-Unis d'Europe fait peur à beaucoup, à cause de ses connotations fédérales. Le sens des réalités a amené J. Delors et J. Santer à ne pas l'employer au cours de leur présidence de la Commission européenne. Nombreux pour ne pas dire majoritaires sont les observateurs qui pensent que de véritables Etats-Unis d'Europe sont hors de portée, du moins dans un avenir prévisible. A quoi bon l'employer dès lors? On serait tenté de répondre: parce que les hommes et les femmes ont besoin de rêves et d'utopies.

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45 Le mémorandum de 1930 a été en fait rédigé par Alexis Léger, secrétaire général du Quai d'Orsay, mieux connu sous le nom de St. John Perse, prix Nobel de littérature (1960).

# Results of the Poll

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## The Students of the College of Europe

### *1. The Poll*


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The College of Europe is a Post-Graduate Institute for European Studies based in Bruges, Belgium, and Natolin, Poland. During the current academic year 2002-2003, the campus of Bruges holds students of thirty-nine nationalities within three departments: Politics and Administration (POL), Law (LAW), and Economics (ECO). The cultural variety of the students is what makes the richness of the College. It represents in a certain sense a 'European microcosm', and President Giscard d'Estaing probably had this 'laboratory' in mind when he invited the students to conduct a poll on their preferred name for the future Europe.

An overall of 275 students composed the sample. 169 students expressed their preference, which amounts to a share of 61,5%. The number of voting students per nationality is presented at the end of this section. The question posed to the students was: 'What is your preference for the name of the future Europe?'

The results of the poll are presented as follows. In the next section (2), some partial analyses are presented in addition to an illustration of the general result as aggregate preference of all the students. First, students' preferences are shown divided by department of studies. Second, these preferences are reported according to their country of origin. Three main groups have been retained: the students coming from 1) the Fifteen EU Member Countries, 2) the candidate countries, and 3) the six founding Member States. Third, a graph with the preferences expressed by students with double nationalities is presented. Finally, statistics referring to sex of the students are given. Section 3 presents some of the comments made by students on the occasion of the vote. They vary


across all different countries, from Norway to Italy, from Portugal to China HK, and from Ireland to Germany, to name but a few. Last section (4) briefly reports the result of the general poll conducted in the twin campus of Natolin, Poland.






## 2. Results


The following graph reports the percentage of students voting in the poll, by Department. Participating students were 90 out of 123 for the POL department; 62 out of 114 for the Law Department, and 17 out of 38 for the ECO department.




The graph below shows the results of the poll for students of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies. 'European Community' comes behind 'European Union'. 'United Europe' seems very little favoured, and less preferred also than other possible denominations suggested directly by the students.




The following graph shows the results of the poll among Law Students. 'United States of Europe' is the second most preferred name after 'European Union', although the distance is wide. European Community and United Europe received equal support. The 'lawyers' have not suggested any other potential name for the future Europe.




The graph below puts in evidence the results for the students of the Economic Department. The highest percentage score for 'United Europe' has been recorded among them, though still trailing behind 'European Union'. Interestingly enough, no preference has been expressed for either 'European Community' or 'United States of Europe'.




The following graph shows the general results of the poll on the name for the future Europe, all departments and nationalities included. Three students out of four have expressed their preference for maintaining the current name. 'European Community', 'United States of Europe' and 'United Europe' have obtained almost the same percentage. Some other possible denominations, aggregated under the item 'other', have obtained 4% of the preferences.




A graph with the composition of the sample by group of countries is presented below. Shares represent the percentages of voting students coming from the EU, the candidate countries, and non-European countries respectively.




The following graph contains the results of the poll for the vote of students who are nationals of the Fifteen Member Countries. The current name is preferred by almost four students out of five. The second best name is United States of Europe.



The results of the poll among the students from the Candidate Countries shows that 'United Europe' and 'European Community' have the same percentage of preferences after 'European Union'. Contrary to the results among nationals of the current Member States, 'United States of Europe' has received only a meagre 5%. No preference for any other possible name has been expressed by these students.




The following graph presents the results of the poll among the students who are nationals of the six Founding Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands (70 out of 104 students from these countries voted). There seems to be no particular preference for the name 'European Community', less preferred than 'United States of Europe' and the newly coined 'United Europe', despite the long-term membership of the six countries in the European Communities.





Quite interestingly, a fourth group composed of non-European students is unanimously in favour of maintaining the current name 'European Union'.

Some students of the College have a double nationality. The data is interesting as it reveals the attachment to the current name by young nationals of two countries who are unlikely to have a strong feeling of belonging to only one country. 12 out of 25 students with double nationality voted.



The last two graphs show the students' preferences according to their sex. More than four out of five female students of the College are in favour of keeping the current name. Behind 'European Union', 'United Europe' is the most favoured name by the female students, and 'European Community' by the male students.





### 3. Comments

I would not chose 'United States of Europe', as this name suggests an associative link to the United States of America, which would harm the – in my point of view – perceived uniqueness of the EU, i.e. its *sui generis* character. Secondly, 'United Europe' sounds like the name of a football club. As a second best option, I would chose 'European Community', but this name covers from a judicial point of view only one part of the European integration project and does not reflect the idea that the EU is more than only economic integration. The name European Union reflects the political dimension of the integration project. It can serve as a better basis to create some form of European identity, also because many citizens are already familiar with the name, as it is also the current name. Changing the name would bring more confusion to the population of the member states and would undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the integration project.

Jessica Northey, United Kingdom

'United States of Europe' makes us think that the future Europe is something of the states, whereas it is also about the peoples. United Europe is too much, when Europe is not yet united. How will the Bulgarians feel to know that they

are still outside the 'United Europe'? A united Europe is the end of the process. European Community is the best name for the polity that is being built. It has the meaning of the *Civitas*, the working towards the common good. A community is a work for everyone. A shared responsibility.

João António Teixeira Guerreiro Valente, Portugal

After long centuries of divisions, Europe is finally getting united. So why not call it as it is: 'Europe'? It would be a strong message of unification towards both Europe itself and the external world. In a few years, the European countries that are not part of this historical project will be out only for their own choices. 'Europe' is neither a trade mark, nor a mere geographical expression. It reminds everyone of a tradition of common experiences that have contributed to the political, cultural, economic and social progress of mankind. A number of great artists, scientists, travellers, philosophers, writers, and other historical figures have contributed to set up a common feeling which is shared by the peoples all around the old continent. Therefore, no one can deny the legitimate right of the Europeans to call themselves what they are. Moreover, the word 'Europe' is largely used to mean what currently is the European Union, like 'America' is already used to call the United States, even if it is not the only country of the western hemisphere.

Roberto Francia, Italy

'European Community' – No need to go to the doctor until you are sick!

Regina O'Connor, Ireland

Mon choix procède d'une part de l'élimination des trois noms concurrents et d'autre part de l'adhésion à l'idée d'Europe unie. En effet, 'Communauté européenne' et 'Union européenne' correspondent à des réalités de la construction européenne. Or ces réalités sont sur le point d'être dépassées et approfondies avec l'élargissement progressif à tout le continent européen et le développement de l'intégration quasi-fédérale de l'Europe. Quant aux 'Etats-Unis d'Europe', cette dénomination rappelle celle des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Or, les deux projets d'intégration, s'ils présentent parfois des similitudes, n'en



demeurent pas moins différents tant par leurs objectifs, la méthode choisie, que par l'histoire. Ainsi, le nom 'Europe Unie' semble à mon avis s'imposer et ceci, pas uniquement par élimination. Outre le projet réaliste de bâtir une puissance politique et économique capable de tenir son rang dans le monde, la construction européenne se caractérise aussi par la volonté historique d'enraciner la paix sur le continent européen. Unir l'Europe, c'est en cela que le projet de construction européenne peut le mieux être résumé. Dès lors, affirmer l'Europe unie porterait la proclamation de l'objectif de paix, tout en traduisant son caractère irréversible.

Frédéric Versini, France

A new name will no doubt prove confusing, as the current distinctions of EU/EC/EEC/etc... are still not clear to many. If there is to be a new name then, should it not be something completely different, inspirational or simply zany and fun? How about historic 'Europa', or artistic 'Eurovision Union'. Possible confusion with a popular music contest of the same name might occur, but at least this is fun, light-hearted, and open to all countries, as the EU should aim to be. More seriously, a 'vision' of solidarité, peace and prosperity, is perhaps not reflected by reversing the words. More likely, a confirmation that Europe is overrun by bureaucracy... The 'European Union' is established in our minds and language. Any other name takes itself too seriously. 'United Europe' is good, but there is no real difference between the 'European Union' and 'United Europe'. What would it change? It would confuse, create bureaucracy and perhaps be seen as marketing. There is little point in uniting for uniting's sake. The point is to clarify our goals; the reason behind our solidarity and unity - that of peace and sustainable development. We need to sort out the problems, unify with the new states, and then, if we achieve this successfully, a new name could capture this. Currently we have not proved the effectiveness of our procedures and institutions to the people of Europe. If we fail to reform, the new name would be seen as synonymous with our failure. There are more pressing issues right now. 'European Community' was fine, why did we change this actually and did it work?

Christiaan Vinkenborg, Netherlands

Keeping the current appellation of the *sui generis* animal which the EU is, might help to consolidate the attachment of people to the European construction: as scholars have already pointed out numerous times, there is a deficit of European identity and this could not be surmounted only by changing the name of Europe. 'European Union' has already become a name commonly used in our daily life, and Europeans might already find a certain sense of belonging that could be negatively affected by the change of name. Therefore, in my opinion, the current name should be kept, but the 'substance' of European integration could evolve, bringing through a process of widening, deepening, and reshaping of the institutions, much more strength to the Union. There is currently hope that this might be achieved through the Convention.

Ana-Cristina Costea, Romania

Generally, I welcome the idea to underline the current effort of reshaping the European construction by the strong symbolic gesture that would be the change of the name (as already done for the Maastricht treaty). Nevertheless, in my opinion, the name should above all reflect the outcome of the Convention and the following IGC; this is why I indicated two alternatives: 1) Either the modifications to the European construction remain only marginal and I don't see any need or benefit in changing the name (the lowest common denominator might be to abolish the very confusing and complex pillar structure, i.e. generalise the use of 'European Union'); 2) Or the representatives of the European peoples gathered in the Convention and the IGC manage to agree on a considerable step forward to a more federal Europe, by declaring a European constitution. In this case – taking as an example the functioning and also the name of my home country – it would be brave to admit where we are heading: a Federal Republic of Europe.

Tobias Grothe, Germany

The other names are horrible, and moreover, to change to something completely unknown would bring more confusion. Although, it would also imply a change, I slightly prefer 'European Community', especially in the light of the forthcoming enlargements. (Norwegians were very upset with the quite recent change of names before the referendum in 1995 – it was much more dangerous sovereignty-wise to enter a 'union' than a 'community'). It would be interesting to find out how this is currently perceived in the current new-member countries.

Marit Undseth, Norway

The name of the future Europe, in my opinion, should remain 'European Union'. In order to emphasize the difference between Europe and the USA the term 'United States' should be avoided when describing Europe. The name European Union suggests continuity and at the same time it shows a more advanced stage of the integration process than the name 'European Community'. Europe should consider taking the name 'United Europe', once the number of member states is definite, that is if the entire enlargement procedure is complete and there are no more new member states to come. Before this happens, Europe cannot consider itself truly 'united'.

Zsófia Wagner, Hungary


The people got used to the title of 'European Union'. 'European Community' is past tense and it would be highly confusing for us to use this word again. (Most people in HK think that 'European Community' has died and has been completely replaced by 'European Union'). The other two names, or any names 'more progressive' than the 'European Union', are only meaningful if the European institutional level becomes more important than it is now. We still have to deal with the national levels for most issues. For example, before HK had the visa-free status for Schengen countries, we applied for a visa from the national consulate, not from the EU. Now we have visa-free status but we perceive that it is the national governments who approved of this collectively, not the EU. And I don't think the Convention will change the current situation much. Besides, in Chinese we have two names for all countries, one is the full name (e.g. The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) and the other is the acronym (e.g. USSR) which we use in most cases. In Chinese we have a certain flexibility to form it. For example, 'Union' in Chinese is made up by combining the words 'united' and 'alliance' together. For USSR, we chose the word 'united' (more 'state' or 'supranational') for its acronym while for EU we chose 'alliance' (more 'inter-governmental'). So no matter what name is chosen for 'Europe', we still can manipulate the acronym to make it 'fit to our perception' of EU, EC, or whatever you might want to call it.

Simon Tse, China HK

#### 4. The Poll on the Name of the Future Europe at the Campus of Natolin

What follows is the result of the poll on the name of the future Europe conducted, jointly although separately, at the campus of Natolin (Poland) of the College of Europe. 72 out of a total of 94 students participated. The students of Natolin prefer to retain the current name. However, they seem to be more open to other possible names. The campus of Natolin includes a high percentage of students who are nationals of Central and Eastern European countries. This probably contributes to explain that the second most preferred name is 'United Europe', behind which lies an idea of re-uniting Europe with current major enlargement after decades of division within a bipolar world.

The question asked to the students of the Natolin campus was: 'What name would you choose for the future "redirected Union"?'.



# Recommendation to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the Convention

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## **The Students of the College of Europe**

This broad reflection has revealed that the demands placed on a name for the new Europe are not insignificant. This name must express our belonging to a social and cultural community, our resolution for common economic endeavour, and our historic construction of a unique political entity for ourselves and for each other. But this name must not only act as an expression of our past efforts, it must also be a statement of our future, one in which we will affirm our common identity in the reunification of Europe and a constitution cementing the foundations of this shared creation.

According to the results of the poll, the Students of the College of Europe recommend that the name for the future Europe should be:

## European Union

Our designation of this name seeks to illustrate that this construction is part of an ongoing process towards political unification, that it is European in identity, character and vocation, and, fundamentally, that this 'Union' is all the more real with the accession of Central and Eastern European countries.

We wish to thank the President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, for recalling that political efforts to construct Europe materially must be conducted in a context of broad reflection on the nature of this European entity and how we wish to construct it symbolically for present and future generations. As students of the College of Europe, we are honoured to have been able to participate in this endeavour.



## Book Reviews

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**Anthony Pagden (ed.),** *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 377 pp., £15.95.

In a year dominated by the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent debate on the name of Europe, Anthony Pagden's book offers an interesting insight of the evolution of 'the collective idea of Europe as a political and cultural domain' (p. 1) from the Antiquity to the present days. This book is the result of collective research gathering fifteen contributors from a wide spectrum of social science disciplines (political science, history, anthropology, law) and with very different cultural backgrounds. Though quite diverse, the articles can be divided into three main parts, dealing with the idea of 'Europe', European identity and the present day European Union.

Replying to those who argue that European identity is an illusion, Anthony Pagden considers that even if imprecise, the identity of 'Europe' exists and is like all identities 'a construction, an elaborate palimpsest of stories, images, resonances, collective memories, invented and carefully nurtured traditions' (p. 33). Using a historical perspective, Pagden traces the distinctive characteristics of 'Europe' starting from the ancient legend of Europa and ending with contemporary Europe: urban life inherited from the Greek cities, law-governed peoples following the Roman tradition, Christianity as common religion and linguistic unity in certain periods, the importance of ownership, the seventeenth and eighteenth century commercial society, the belief in the capacity of science and technology.

Four other contributions complete the overview of the idea of 'Europe' in history: the tension between cosmopolitanism and localism in the Middle Ages (W. Chester Jordan), the republican model or the Dutch Idea of Europe (H. W. Blom), the Enlightenment Europe seen by J.A. Pocock as 'a republic of states held together by commerce' (p. 70), the Kantian idea of Europe as a federation of independent states (J. Tully), the Napoleonic Empire and the Europe of Nations (B. Fontana).

A second group of articles focuses on 'European' identity. W. Nippel presents Max Weber's description of the European citizen, which underlined the importance of the development of towns in Medieval Europe drawing a famous distinction between the ancient military-orientated *homo politicus* and the medieval *homo economicus* aiming for peaceful gains through commerce and trade. Considering that 'the idea of Europe' has filtered through the complex populations of the European continent and is "refracted" through the prisms of daily interactions' (p. 145), M. Herzfeld performs an interesting analysis of the European identity in Greece, where he can better observe in everyday life the tension between 'being European' and 'being other than European'. In her study of nationalism, A. Chebel d'Appollonia defines two types of European nationalism: 'antinational European nationalism' or cosmopolitanism and 'pro-national European nationalism' (p. 173). Two other contributions to be mentioned are that of L. Paserini, who focuses on European cultural identity, and that of T. Asad, who tries to demonstrate that Europe can even represent Islam by accepting the idea of a complex space 'in which everyone lives as a minority among minorities' (p. 227).

The third group of articles is perhaps the most interesting part of the book for students and scholars of European integration, as it focuses on present day developments linked to the European Union. P. Rutley describes the major contribution of law to European integration through four distinct phases since 1945 while E. Cohen underlines the importance of the Euro as a step towards a federal state through the renunciation of sovereignty in the monetary field. T. Risse-Kappen and D. Engelmann-Martin present the process of Europeanisation of the elites in Germany and the existence of a federalist consensus regarding Europe which surpasses the traditional political divides. Finally, A. de Blas Guerrero offers the example of the Spanish Convivencia and the importance of pluralism.



A critical point might be raised concerning the lack of a clear separation between the different kinds of articles, which we have arbitrarily separated into three groups: those focusing on the history of the Idea of Europe, those analysing European identity mainly from an anthropological and sociological perspective, and finally, the articles dedicated to the present day European Union. This lack of coherence might cause some problems to those expecting a clear exposé on the idea of Europe, and several analyses tend to over-lap.

These disadvantages are nevertheless compensated by the rich information and the quality of the writers. Additionally, the multidisciplinary approach allows a better understanding of all the complexity underlying the 'Idea' - with a capital 'I' - in a somewhat platonian, absolute sense - of Europe. In this sense, Pagden's conclusion is quite optimistic as it considers that the European Union 'will surely come closer than any political order has ever done before to establish what means to be a European' (p. 54).

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**Peter H. Gommers**, *Europe. What's in a Name*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001, 223 pp, 58 euro.

'This inventory only wishes to illustrate that the European myth has stayed alive in our culture throughout the ages and fully continues to remain so up to this day' (p. 185).

Peter H. Gommers' *Europe. What's in a name?* is an exhaustive and rich promenade next to the display cabinets that contain the name of Europe. On the course of this trip, he shows the more permanent slope of Europe, the one that stays over changes of civilisations, wars, political unions and division, even over natural changes. The slope of the myth that gave name to the piece of land whose limits we discuss today, not only in the debates in the Convention, but especially with regard to the enlargement of the European Union.

Divided into two parts, this book leads the reader to firstly explore the origins and *raison d'être* of the name 'Europe', in order to understand the second part,

which addresses how this myth is internalised and reflected generation after generation in artistic representations. The name 'Europe' is analysed from three different perspectives: geographical, mythological and through the relation of causality between the name 'Europe' and the definition of the continent as such. This distribution of the content allows the reader to have a full picture of the connections between the different aspects of this name.

This perspective focuses on Europe as a name, showing a catalogue of European culture through a very specific angle, and in this way identifying the links between the different civilizations in Europe. Describing and interpreting the past allows an opening of the doors to future. But not only this, the promenade through the different mythological conceptions and the artistic representations allows the reader to realise that the concept of Europe, even the concept of its myth, has been adapted to the different eras: a permanent concept that probably stays alive because of its capacity to adapt to the different times, while staying a point of departure of European culture. The author is, however, just setting up the elements for the reader to reach this conclusion. At no time does the author give a clear message. On the contrary, he shows both the differences and the similarities between the different conceptions of the name Europe, leaving it up to the reader to choose.

From the point of view of style, the amount of research done for every single page of the book is enormous, proving an exhaustive scientific effort to be the author's prime objective. This is why certain passages of the text, especially those regarding the exposition of the mythological origins of the name 'Europe', become rather difficult to read, without a pencil and paper in hand, allowing the complete comprehension of the different and interconnected mythological stories. The author's quick style formed by short sentences almost lacking linking words helps to better assimilate the large quantity of information given in some of the parts.

On the other hand, this work compiles a whole range of artistic representations, covering all kinds of arts, in a never-ending combination of poetry, sculpture and painting photographs, maps, figures, theatre plays, etc. Images thus constitute a perfect complement aiding the full understanding of the exhaustive explanations.

Perfect for a calm reading, with time to draw the multiple mythological stories, and to savour every piece of art, it constitutes a very useful tool for

any kind of work related to European identity and culture – a top topic for the contemporary debate about the future of Europe.

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**Cristina Acidini Luchinat et al.,** *Il mito di Europa. Da fanciulla rapita a continente*, Prato: Giunti, 2002, 344 pp., 35 euro.

Cet ouvrage collectif est le catalogue de l'exposition homonyme qui s'est tenue aux *Uffizi* à Florence, du 6 juin 2002 au 6 janvier 2003.

Le séminaire *Figures d'Europe: immagini e miti per l'Europa* (11-13 avril 2002) organisé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen de Fiesole, ainsi que les deux précédentes expositions qui avaient eu lieu en Allemagne, à Brême en 1988 et à Berlin en 2001, ont apporté d'importantes contributions à la réalisation de ce livre.

Le rapt de la jeune princesse phénicienne Europe par Jupiter transfiguré en taureau est le fil rouge du livre, et l'artifice proposant au lecteur une variante actuelle de l'histoire: l'origine ancienne du nom du Continent.

Le catalogue, dressé suivant l'ordre chronologique des œuvres exposées, présente les diverses interprétations figuratives que les artistes ont données au mythe d'Europe, en le resituant dans les contextes sociaux, culturels et économiques des différentes époques.

La dimension symbolique du mythe évoque les mouvements migratoires d'Asie Mineure et la colonisation des terres au Nord-Nord-Ouest de l'actuel Liban, et qui prirent ensuite le nom d'Europe. Le voyage maritime de Sidon à Crète devient l'allégorie de séparation originelle entre la civilisation grecque de ses origines nord-africaines, et plus généralement de l'Orient.

Au V siècle av. J.C., Hérodote doutait déjà de la tradition qui identifie le nom du Continent avec celui de la jeune fille enlevée par Jupiter: il la considérait comme la conséquence de la coutume qu'avaient les Anciens d'attribuer une origine divine aux peuples et à la fondation des villes.

L'étymologie du mot est aussi incertaine que la signification du mythe. La plupart des experts privilégie le sens sémitique d'obscurité' en assimilant le nom du Continent à l'Occident géographique, soit le lieu où le soleil se couche, le point cardinal suivi par les peuples migrant vers la Grèce et la direction d'où soufflait Euro, le vent homérique.

Parmi les diverses interprétations qui ont été données du rapt, l'acception géographique demeure la plus connue et partagée: Europe est le Continent qui, avec l'Asie et l'Afrique, et depuis Christophe Colombe avec l'Amérique, occupait tout le monde découvert. Matriarcale et royale dans les représentations qui sont en données, la personnification du Vieux Continent est presque toujours accompagnée de l'image du taureau, ainsi que des symboles nobles de la religion, des sciences, des lettres, des arts et des disciplines militaires.

Au Moyen Age, le mythe survécut en tant qu'allégorie religieuse et morale, en incarnant la défense de l'Occident chrétien contre l'Orient islamique.

Au XVIIème siècle, la misère et les tumultes belliqueux qui agitaient le Continent influencèrent la perception du mythe. De titulaire de la fierté impériale, la princesse phénicienne devint l'incarnation d'une Europe souffrante, traversée de part en part par les guerres et les schismes religieux.

L'époque romantique vit se dissiper l'intérêt pour la mythologie classique. Dans un contexte où émergent les nationalismes, les artistes de l'époque privilégiaient les gestes héroïques liées à l'histoire et aux traditions de chaque Etat. Ce n'est qu'au milieu du XIXème siècle que la science, se penchant sur la psyché humaine, permit aux mythes d'être à nouveau considérés la traduction, le produit et la source de la fantaisie, de l'imagination et des rêves.

La peinture contemporaine a représenté deux versions du mythe. La première se rattache à la valorisation de la figure féminine dans la société moderne: le rencontre entre Europe et le taureau est interprété comme échange entre les genres, mélange des rôles traditionnels et altération des différences sexuelles. La deuxième version, dont la portée est plus satyrique, fut suggérée par la domination de l'Allemagne nazie.

Une variante secondaire du parcours mythologique mène Europe dans le ciel de l'astronomie. En 1610, Galilée découvrit les quatre premiers satellites de Jupiter. Désireux de bénéficier de la protection de la famille Medici, il aurait voulu les

appelés *medicea sidera*, étoiles médicéennes; à la suite d'un débat international, les noms des corps célestes furent choisis parmi les nombreux amours du dieu: Europe orbite donc autour de son ancien amant, de même que la prêtresse Io, la nymphe Calixte et l'échanson Ganymède.

Le livre met en avant la dimension très actuelle du mythe en tant que patrimoine collectif, ceci au moment où les peuples du Vieux Continent sont plus que jamais à la recherche d'une identité européenne, d'une origine symbolique commune.

Le mythe est symbole d'agrégation: l'enlèvement et les noces d'Europe avec le dieu représentent l'union entre des individus d'origine et culture différentes. Le voyage par mer symbolise à la fois la liaison entre deux terres et deux diversités.

Le mythe revêt une dimension particulière dans le développement d'un sentiment d'appartenance collective au passé, présent et future du Continent; pour la construction d'une Europe moderne et pluraliste, d'un archipel de diversités et différences, où les aspects particuliers peuvent converger et coexister.

Cet ouvrage n'est pas un simple catalogue: il est une œuvre autonome qui réunit le charme de la mythologie, l'histoire du Continent et la critique artistique.

La réunion des contributions de plusieurs auteurs confère à l'œuvre une objectivité accrue et permet au lecteur de découvrir le mythe et ses interprétations de plusieurs points de vue. En outre, l'enchaînement chronologique des chapitres et la division du livre en sections thématiques en facilitent la compréhension.

La lecture est agréable et reposante, grâce à une mise en page claire et aérée et à des nombreuses illustrations, dont on regrettera simplement qu'elles soient pour la plupart en noir et blanc.

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**Michael Heffernan**, *The Meaning of Europe. Geography and Geopolitics*, London: Arnold Hodder Headline Group Publishers, 1998, 290 pp., £16.

In his book Michael Heffernan presents the geopolitical and geographical factors influencing the understanding of the notion 'Europe' in an analytical and descriptive way, while trying to answer questions fundamental to his work: what Europe has meant in the past and what it might mean in the future. Arguing that the meaning is flexible and dependable on government, sovereignty and citizenship, he introduces 'geopolitical invention' as an explanation for the process of creating the notion of 'Europe'.

The book, consisting of four chapters, is a compilation of various complex approaches towards a deeper understanding of the meaning of 'Europe' from a historical perspective. However, with summaries of the key ideas developed throughout the book, both in the introduction and after every chapter, the author secures 'easy access' for every reader willing to learn something about the notion of 'Europe'. In addition, while searching for a clearer structure the book has been based on a continuum: with history as a base, it smoothly explains the birth of geopolitical ideas in order to show their impact on current discussion on a possible future for Europe.

The first chapter explains the historical background of the conceptualisation of word 'Europe'. By using the concept of 'territorialisation of power' (p. 17) the author argues that it is territory that became a primary basis of political identity and sovereignty allowing at the same time 'geopolitical invention' to be born. As for the time perspective: the author starts his description from the XVI century in order to conclude with the history of the end of XIX century when Europe was undergoing considerable political and social changes. Maps included throughout the pages of the first chapter allow the reader to get well acquainted with the social perception of 'Europe' and show gradual development of the meaning of 'European'. It is a 'gradual' evolution since, as the author argues rightly, every idea created in the course of the centuries was never fully substituted by another, rather it was always a build-up basis for further development.

The second chapter, also of rather historical nature, covers the period from the 1880s until the end of World War I. The events occurring in this period have definitely influenced perceptions of Europe. Societies, concentrated on their internal geopolitics, searched for their national identities while they continued to look at the meaning of Europe. In this period various geopolitical theories were

created *inter alia* those of Halford Mackinder and Albrecht Penck. Some of the theories underlined optimism towards *fin de siècle* geopolitics while others were pessimistic. The author presents both approaches in a compact manner, providing us with a constructive overview of selected main ideas which, to some extent, influenced the XX century thinking of Europe.

The third chapter examines the evolution of the European theories from 1918 and throughout the twenties and thirties until the end of World War II, including the influence of three ideologies: communism, fascism and liberal democracy developing at the time. It is argued that having those three incompatible ideologies strongly influenced the approach towards the notion of 'Europe' which culminated with World War II and 'together they provided the context within which a new European geopolitics arose' (p. 111).

The fourth chapter is devoted to an evaluation of the influence of these theories on a legal creation of Europe in the form of treaties, intergovernmental institutions and pan-European organisations starting from 1945 to the early nineties. It is argued that the Cold War division of Europe narrowed the hegemonic idea of Europe built throughout the centuries. The author shows the different approaches towards Europe in two parts of the world, Western and communist, in order to come to the conclusion that the division only initially facilitated the development of European integration of the western half of the continent; soon after the process took off on its own. Having stated that, author mentions the need for further deepening of a 'social feeling' of being European: 'the EU has still not developed beyond a relatively narrow economic agenda and has also singularly failed to capture the imagination of the European peoples' (p. 233).

Written in 1998, the book analyses a subject which, especially in present days, five years on, is of a great importance. On the 16th of April this year, in Athens, ten European states signed Accession Treaties, allowing them to join the European Union. The biggest enlargement in the history of the European integration is taking place. However, due to the Convention's work on institutional reform of the EU and further candidates hoping to join the EU, the debate on the future, desirable, shape of 'Europe' is ongoing. Politicians, academics and societies debate over the notion of 'Europe' and what it means 'to be European'. Taking it into consideration, *The Meaning of Europe* may have a considerable input towards the ongoing discussion on Europe's political geography: as the author states in the introduction: the term 'Europe [...] is set

to dominate the political process well into the twenty-first century' (p. 1). Undoubtedly it is a valuable book to learn about or to refresh knowledge on ideas shaped throughout centuries and which influence the current debate on the future of Europe and its boundaries.

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